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HE SOVIET UNION destroyed Korean Airlines Flight
""#007 over the Pacific. Terrorists destroyed Pan American Flight #103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. In both tragedies, as in numerous other airplane crashes, hundreds died.
A familiar pattern has emerged: headline news, public
shock and outcry, and government investigations.
A less publicized, but equally clear, pattern has also developed: the victims' families shortly hire lawyers, thereby beginning a long, complex process of litigation. For example,
lawyers began working on the case immediately after Pan
Am #103 crashed in December 1988, but the federal jury
did not reach its verdict until July 19921 and the litigation
2
continues today-over six years later.
On April 4, 1989, less than four months after the crash of
Flight #103, the Judicial Panel of Multidistrict Litigation
consolidated the eighteen suits already pending in four federal districts.' The Panel also noted that "numerous additional related actions" were pending in "various district
I Pan Am Ruled Liable in Flight 103 Bombing. Damages CouldAmount to $300 Million,
WASH. PosT, July 11, 1992, at A3.
2 A divided Second Circuit upheld the verdict in January 1994, Pagnucco v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 1994 WL 25773 (2d Cir. Jan. 31, 1994), but the defendants petitioned for a rehearing and the court withdrew its decision. On reconsideration, the
court affirmed the liability verdict, but remanded the case to the district court to
recalculate the damages. Pagnucco v. Pan Am. World Airways, 1994 WL 498454, at
*45 n.1 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 1994).
3 In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot., on December 21, 1988, 709 F. Supp. 231,
232 (J.P.M.L. 1989). The Panel consolidated the actions before Judge Platt of the
Eastern District of New York.
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courts."' Other plaintiffs brought state wrongful death actions, and the district court certified an interim appeal to
resolve the resulting conflict of laws question.5
In total, the Lockerbie plaintiffs sued Pan Am for several
hundred million dollars. If the verdict finding Pan Am
guilty of "willful misconduct" survives the pending challenges, the 210 plaintiffs seem likely to win a judgment
worth many millions of dollars.6 Even so, however, Pan
Am's bankruptcy (for which the Lockerbie disaster and this
litigation are at least partly responsible) 7 may prevent them
from collecting much of the damage award 8 and their longtime lawyers are sure to claim much of their winnings.
Meanwhile, at least 549 Lockerbie residents have sued Pan
Am 9 and the airline has sued the Government of Libya and
4 Id. at 232 n. 1. Fifty-four plaintiffs brought a significant "tag-along" action in the
Southern District of Florida, which was consolidated in January 1991. Pan Am.
World Airways v. Coker, 950 F.2d 839, 842 (2d Cir. 1991).
5 In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 709 F. Supp. at 231.
6 Estimates vary considerably. Compare Pan Am Ruled Liable in Fight 103 Bombing:
Damages Could Amount to $300. Million, WAsH. PosT, July 11, 1992, at A3 with John
Arlidge, Court Paves Way for £500 Million Claim over Lockebie, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 2,
1994, at 5.
The firstjury award was announced onJuly 22, 1992: $9.23 million. Plaintiffs had
sought a whopping $25.25 million. This award may well prove to be above the average received by the families of Lockerbie victims, since $6 million of the damages
represented the lost earnings of a successful attorney. The still-large remainder of
over $3 million, however, compensated his family for the loss of their husband and
father-a type of damages which will be available to the families of many victims.
David Von Drehle, Family Awarded $9 Million in Pan Am Bombing Case, WASH. POST,
July 23, 1992, at A3. Only two other damage verdicts have been rendered thus far:
$9 million for another attorney and $1.74 million for an electrician/part-time musician. Pagnucco v. Pan Am. Airways, 37 F.3d 804, 804 (2d Cir. 1994). The Second
Circuit vacated these three damage awards and remanded the case for further proceedings on the calculation of damages for loss of society and support. Id. at *25.
The damage trials for 207 passengers still await. Id.at *2.
SeeJames Ott & Anthony L.Velocci, Jr., Inability to Adapt in New Era of Aviation
Doomed Pan Am, Av. W. & SPACE TEcH., Dec. 23, 1991, at 28 (quoting Najeeb
Halaby, former head of Pan Am and the Federal Aviation Administration, describing
the Lockerbie disaster as the "fatal blow").
8 If Pan Am's insurance proves insufficient to cover the awards, plaintiffs will have
to compete with Pan Am's other creditors to collect their damages. Plaintiffs believe
Pan Am's insurance will cover up to $750 million in damages. Ronald Sullivan, Court
Upholds Pan Am 103 Awards, N.Y. TIMvs, Feb. 1, 1994, at D2. The bankruptcy also
further complicates the litigation. See Murray v. Pan Am. World Airways, 16 F.3d 513
(2d Cir. 1994).
9 Murray, 16 F.3d at 514.
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the two Libyans accused in the bombing.10 In short, the
Lockerbie litigation is a messnIa mess of the sort the Mul12
tidistrict Litigation Act is intended to mitigate.
It is also the precise sort of mess which the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air (done at Warsaw, 12 October
1929)-a treaty generally known as the Warsaw Convention 13 is intended to eliminate. This article argues that
the Convention embodies a trade-off between plaintiff passengers and defendant airlines which could effectively promote the timely, efficient resolution of air crash litigation.
In fact, the Convention's formula-strict liability coupled
with a low damage cap-is particularly designed to promote settlement, the most efficient means of resolving mass
tort litigation.
Nevertheless, as the Lockerbie case shows, the system has
not promoted settlement or other forms of rapid resolu-

10Pan Am claimed $300 million in damages, based on lost business and the value
of the destroyed 747. The suit may be seen, however, as an attempt to obtain indemnification from Libya and the accused terrorists for the amount Pan Am may have to
pay the victims' families. James Wires Forrester, Pan Am $300 Million Lawsuit to Fund
Damages-Lawyer, REUTER LIBRARY REP., Dec. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis

Library.
11The same could be said of the KAL litigation, now in its eleventh year. Somebut only some-of the continuing litigation is explained by a dramatic new development in the case: in 1992, Boris Yeltsin released Flight #007's "black box," which the
Soviets had kept secret for years. Based on this new evidence, KAL moved to vacate
the judgment against it, causing the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to consolidate the matter a second time before Judge Robinson of the D.D.C. In re KAL,
1994 WL 143009 (J.P.M.L. Apr. 12, 1994). Judge Robinson denied the motion, finding that the motion was untimely and the new evidence was unlikely to change the
verdict.' In re KAL, 156 F.R.D. 18 (D.D.C. 1994). The carrier has appealed. Plaintiffs
ordered that the case remain consolidated pending the outcome of KAL's appeal.
In re KAL, unpublished order, Nov. 29, 1994 (copy on file with the author). Other
legal battles over damage awards will then continue. See Steven Pounian, Korean Air
Lines Fight #7 - Ten Years Later, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29, 1993, at 3; Korean Air Lines 007
DisasterLitigation - Damage Awards Rendered in Ten PassengerCases, 12 LLoYD's AVIATION LAw (July 15, 1993).
12 28 U.S.C.S. § 1407 & n.2 (Law. Co-op. 1988).
" Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, openedfor signatureOct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S.
11, rqprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
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tion.1 4 This article, therefore, explores the implementation
of the Warsaw Convention by American courts, including
their approach to mass tort management and treaty interpretation. Specifically, the article evaluates the Warsaw
Convention cases according to the rules of treaty interpretation codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and a test for mass tort management developed by
Judge Jack Weinstein, a leading authority on the subject.
These two separate standards are actually linked: since the
Warsaw Convention is designed to promote mass tort management, misinterpretation of the Convention is linked to
the mismanagement of air disaster cases.
Part I of this article describes the Warsaw Convention.
Part II then presents criticisms of the Convention, that have
led to subsequent developments in the "Warsaw system."
Parts III and IV present the principles of treaty interpretation and mass tort management that judges should apply in
international air disaster cases. Part V then examines how
American judges have applied these principles to resolve a
variety of issues which have arisen in implementing the
Warsaw Convention. The article concludes by proposing
the establishment of a "shadow" court to hear Warsaw Convention cases as a partial solution to the current misinterpretation and mismanagement; a more complete solution
14It should be noted, however, that the Lockerbie litigation cannot be evaluated
entirely on the basis of economics and efficiency. Beyond compensation, the plain-

tiffs also sought a public forum to voice their complaints against Pan Am and a
determination, by ajury of their peers, that the airline was responsible for the tragedy. The ongoing litigation has also facilitated the families' access to the media,

where they have successfully pushed for security legislation, an anti-terrorism treaty,
a memorial at Arlington National Cemetery, and United Nations sanctions against
Libya. See Alan R. Schwartz & Michael J. Bayer, Pan Am Flight 103 and the Aviation
Security Improvement Act of 1990, LOGISTICS & TRANSp. IEv., Mar. 1992, at 61; David
Hughes, Treaty Approved at ICAO Conference Requires Markings on PlasticExplosives, 134
Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 25, 1991, at 63; U.N.S.C. Res. 731, 748, 883. Public

concerns about Flight #103 may also have been allayed by a sense that "justice has
been done" by the jury verdict. Also, the Pan Am court spectacle should encourage
other airlines to enforce security measures more thoroughly than did Pan Am.
Nevertheless, generally speaking, resolving mass torts efficiently benefits plaintiffs,
defendants, and the courts. Yet, aspects of American judicial implementation of the
Warsaw Convention have thwarted this goal. See discussion infra part IV.A.
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will depend on action by the political branches to modify
the Warsaw Convention.
I.

THE WARSAW CONVENTION

Inspired by Charles Lindbergh's historic flight across the
Atlantic in 1927, the international community sought to facilitate the emerging industry of international air travel. International flights presented numerous legal questions,
however. What law would govern landing rights in foreign
countries? Overflight rights? Emergency landing rights?
Would an airline have to comply with the ticketing obligations imposed by the country of ticket purchase, departure,
or destination, or all three? What law would govern the suit
of American, British, French, and German passengers injured if a German airline crashed while flying over France
between Britain and Germany? What about the damage
caused on the ground where the plane crashed in France?
These last two questions could be answered by traditional
conflicts of law methods, the penultimate with some difficulty. The other questions had to be answered by international law. The Chicago Convention of 1944 failed to
establish multilateral rules regulating international air carriage, so international travel today remains governed by a
series of bilateral Air Services Agreements.' 5 The Rome
Surface Damage Convention of 1952 governs "Damage
Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Persons on the Surface," as its formal title indicates. 16 The first and foremost
instrument governing international air travel is the Warsaw
Convention of 1929, which establishes uniform multilateral
rules for documentation and airline liability.' 7 The United
States adhered to the Convention in 1934.
"STUART

M. SPEISER & CHARLES F. KRAUSE, I AVIATION TORT LAW 630 (1978).

16 Rome

Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on

the Surface, Oct. 7, 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 181, reprinted in 19J. AIR L. & COMMERCE 447
(1952) [hereinafter Rome Convention]. The United States participated in the negotiations in Rome, but neither signed nor ratified the Surface Damage Convention.
SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 15, at 630-31. The Rome Convention establishes a
scheme similar to the Warsaw Convention's. Id.
17 Warsaw Convention, supra note 13.
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As the U.S. Constitution proclaims treaties to be "the
supreme law of the Land," 18 the Convention has, since
1934, governed all U.S. litigation involving "international
transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by
aircraft for hire."19 Although the Convention applies to all
litigation from damages due to delays (Article 19) to lost
baggage (Article 18) to burns caused by spilled coffee (Article 17), the Convention is most controversial-both legally
and politically-when it involves mass torts, namely, air
crashes (also Article 17).2 o Only claims against the carrier
(and its agents and employees) for injuries to passengers
are covered. Employees2 ' and other victims 22 must seek
Is U.S.

art. VI. See discussion infra part V.A.
19Warsaw Convention, supra note 13, art. 1 (1). Article 1(2) defines the term "international transportation" for the purposes of establishing the Convention's scope.
A flight need not actually cross international borders to be deemed "international
transportation" under Article 1. See, e.g., Grey v. American Airlines, 227 F.2d 282 (2d
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956) (holding Warsaw Convention applies
where a flight from New York to Mexico crashes while landing for a scheduled stop
in Dallas). Indeed, passengers injured during a crash at take-off at Kennedy Airport
on a flight to San Francisco where they would have changed planes before flying to
Tokyo, may also be governed by the Convention-even if they are American citizens
flying on a U.S. carrier, and even though foreign nationals on the same flight whose
destination was San Francisco would be governed by state tort law. See, e.g., Jack v.
Trans World Airlines, 854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (applying Convention to
three passengers with "international" tickets).
Non-"international" travel is governed solely by domestic law, though some countries (e.g. France) have chosen to apply the Convention's rules domestically. GEORCONsT.

GETTE MILLER, LIABILrY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT: THE WARSAW SYSTEM IN

4 (1977).
17 states:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained [dommage survenu] in
the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily
injury [ision corporele] suffered by a passenger, if the accident which
caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in
the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
21 See, e.g., Sulewski v. Federal Express Corp., 749 F. Supp. 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), aff'd933 F.2d 180 (1991); Coker v. Pan Am. World Airways, 950 F.2d 839, 848
(2d Cir. 1991) (distinguishing the "Rosenkranz action" for a crew member from the
passengers' claims). Sixteen crew members died on Flight #103. PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON AVAnON SECURITY & TERRORISM, REPORT 131-37 (1990).
2 For example, the Pan Am crash killed eleven people on the ground in Lockerbie. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON AVIATION SECURITY & TERROISM, supra note 21.
Claims related to their deaths are governed by state tort law, not by the Warsaw
Convention, since the United States has not adhered to the Rome Convention, supra
note 16. See generaliy Murray v. Pan Am. World Airways, 16 F.3d 513 (2d Cir. 1994)
MUNICIPAL COURTS
20 Article
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their remedies elsewhere. Airlines are liable only for "damage sustained" by the plaintiff, i.e. compensatory damages,
thereby precluding claims for punitive damages. 23 The
Convention allows the carrier to escape liability in certain
but only if it "proves" that the facts so
circumstances,
24
warrant.
In the leading article on the Warsaw Convention, Andreas Lowenfeld and Allan Mendelsohn describe the Convention's purposes. First, the Convention establishes "a
certain degree of uniformity" in documentation and, "to a
degree," in the procedural and substantive law of aviation
litigation. 25 American courts have often placed greater emphasis on the Convention's role in establishing uniformity
of law than did Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn. The Second
Circuit, for example, has recognized uniformity as the
"most, fundamental objective" of the Convention.26 The
Warsaw Convention's formal title also supports this emphasis on the purpose of uniformity: The Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air.2 7
(upholding transfer of claims of 549 Lockerbie residents from Florida state court to
S.D.N.Y.).

infra part V.B.
Under Article 20, an airline is not liable for an "accident" if it can prove it took
"all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible ... to take
such measures." Warsaw Convention, supra note 13. (As the discussion infra part II
shows, however, many airlines waived this defense in the Montreal Agreement.)
Likewise, Article 21 permits courts to negate or reduce damages in accordance with
the local law of contributory or comparative negligence. Id.
25 Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HAgv. L. REv. 497, 498-99 (1967).
- Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922
2-3See discussion

24

(1977) (stating that the Convention "supersede[s] ...

the scores of differing domes-

tic laws," thereby avoiding "jungle-like chaos."). See also Trans World Airlines v.
Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 256, 258 (1984); id. at 264 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("International uniformity, naturally, was the touchstone of the Convention.");
In re Mexico City Aircrash, 708 F.2d 400, 41546 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he cardinal
purpose of the [Convention] is to ensure the existence of a uniform and universal
system of recovery for losses incurred in the course of international air
transportation.").
27 Warsaw Convention, supra note 13 (emphasis added). Accord preamble ("Having recognized the advantage of regulating in a uniform manner the conditions...
of liability of the carrier, [the signatories] ... have concluded and signed the following convention.").
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According to Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, the Convenion's second purpose-limiting airlines' liability-was

"clearly recognized to be the more important" goal. 28 Arti-

cle 22(1) limits liability for personal injury to 125,000 gold
francs, which can be converted to $8300 by the formula in
Article 22(4) of the Convention. 29 This damage cap was
"low even in 1929."30 Article 24 makes exclusive the remedies available under the Convention. 3 1 The negotiators
considered an exclusive damage cap necessary to allow airlines the certainty in liability needed to obtain insurance at
a cost low enough to make aviation economically viable. 2
Thus, the two overriding purposes of the Warsaw Convention may be described as the promotion of uniformity
and certainty in air litigation. The Convention should be interpreted in light of these purposes.33 Other purposes can
be identified from specific articles, or by reading specific
provisions in light of the goals of uniformity and certainty.
For example, Chapter III of the Convention, tided "Liability
of the Carrier," reveals a purpose (related to, but distinct
from, the purpose of certainty) to promote the efficient resolution of air litigation,a purpose which is particularly relevant
to mass torts litigation arising from air disasters.3 4

28

Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 499.

- For a discussion of Article 22's conversion formula in the context of airline

liability for lost baggage, see Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at 260.
-4 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 499.
31See discussion infra part V.C.
32 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 499 (quoting Secretary of State
Cordell Hull). While airlines clearly benefit from the low level of the damage cap,
they also benefit separately from the principle of certainty. A fixed damage capeven at higher levels-would still be important in purchasing liability insurance. See
Franklin Min4 466 U.S. at 256, 258 (identifying the establishment of "a stable and
predictable [liability limit] on which carriers can rely," i.e. certainty, as a purpose of
the Convention).
" See discussion infra part III.
34 Warsaw Convention, supra note 13,arts. 17-30. See In reKorean Airlines Disaster
of September 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. CL
616 (1991) [hereinafter In re KAL]. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (identifying the "just,
speedy, and inexpensive" resolution of claims as the goals of federal courts). See
discussion infra parts II and IV.A.
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CRITICISMS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION

Secretary of State Cordell Hull believed the damage cap
would benefit both passengers and airlines, by "affording a
more definite basis of recovery,... tending to lessen litigation, . . . aid[ing] in the development of international air
transportation, . . . [and] reduc[ing] transportation
charges." 35 Nevertheless, the airlines clearly have been the
primary beneficiaries of the damage cap-so much so that
passengers' objections to the cap have fueled discontent
with the Convention. Understandably, frustration increases
when time passes while damage awards stagnate. Frustrations have been particularly strong in this case because it is
understood that the low damage awards were justified in
1929 to protect a "fledgling industry," but the industry has
subsequently matured and now could buy insurance to pay
36
higher damage awards.
Yet, passengers were "not entirely neglected." 37 Articles
17-19 of the Convention establish airline liability for passengers' damages, with Article 17 concerning personal injury.
Article 17 shifts the burden of proof to the carrier, benefiting passengers even though it falls short of strict liability.38
The exchange of a shift in the burden of proof for a damage cap constitutes the "essential bargain" embodied in the
Convention, 39 and its primary advantage in facilitating settlement of mass tort litigation. Passengers also benefit from
Article 25, which waives the damage cap where the airline is
found guilty of "willful misconduct.", 0 Finally, Article 23 of
the Convention protects passengers from contracts of adheo Quoted in Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 499.
s See discussion infra part V.A.
37 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 500.
3 In one class of cases, the benefit to plaintiffs bf this shift in the burden of proof
is especially clear: slips and falls at the airport. Article 17 applies if the plaintiff can
show that the slip occurred "in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking." Much litigation involves the interpretation of this phrase, with plaintiffs arguing for the Convention to apply and carriers arguing against-reversing the
typical posture of Convention litigation. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Lufthansa German
Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 627 (7th Cir. 1989).
3 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 500.
- See discussion infra part V.B.
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sion by prohibiting contracts that set damage caps lower
than the Convention's, even though Article 22(1) allows
"special contract[s]" setting "a higher limit of liability." 4
Passengers and, especially, the plaintiffs' bar regarded
their benefits under the Convention as inadequate compensation for the low damage cap. The damage cap, which
was "low even in 1929,"42 seemed like a heinous anachronism by the 1960s. While criticism focused on the low level
of the damage cap, passengers were willing to abandon the
Convention altogether because many of their benefits
under it had vanished. For example, the rise of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (as documented in subsequent editions of Prosser on Torts)4" meant that "the Warsaw shift in
the burden of proof-important as it was in 1930-no
longer provided any substantial benefit to passengers that
would be unavailable without the Convention."" Yet, these
changes merely made the Convention less valuable to plaintiffs; they did not make the Convention actually hurtful to
plaintiffs' interests. 45 Thus, their anger focused on the
damage cap and, if that problem could be remedied, they
41 See In reKAL, 932 F.2d 1475, 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting SecondInternational
Conference on Private Aeronautical Law: Minutes (Warsaw 1929) at 47 (Robert C.
Homer & Didier Legrez trans. 1975) (statement of Georges Ripert of France)).
42

Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 499.

Id. at 520-21 (comparing W. PROSSER, TORTS 296 (1st ed. 1941) with W. PROSSER, TORTS 220-21 & nn.28-30 (3d ed. 1964)).
44 Id. at 522. Other common law developments also diminished the Convention's
value to plaintiffs. Conflict of law rules were changing to allow a forum to protect its
residents from unfavorable laws in other forums, thus diminishing the value of the
41

Convention's uniform damage standard in protecting Americans from even lower
damage awards abroad. Id. at 526, 532.

Similarly, case law at the time "knocked down" "one of the main props in the
argument for the Warsaw Convention": a guaranteed right of action under Article
17. Id. at 517-18. The Second Circuit held in Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana,
247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957), that the Convention did not
create an independent cause of action, but merely established rules governing suits
brought under other causes. The Second Circuit eventually reversed itself in 1978,
Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1144 (1979), but it is understandable that plaintiffs' frustrations would have
peaked in the 1960s.
45 The Convention does harm some plaintiffs in one other respect: a plaintiff
cannot obtain jurisdiction in the United States over a foreign airline for a case subject to the Warsaw Convention, even if the defendant has sufficient contacts with the
United States to satisfy constitutional requirements for in personamjurisdiction, un-
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were willing to preserve the benefits of the Convention in
promoting international cooperation and uniformity, and
thereby avoid difficult conflicts of law questions.46
Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn describe in great detail the
subsequent events, in which they both were personally involved as State Department attorneys. In short, U.S. frustrations with the damage cap rose to the level where the
United States decided to demand an increase in the maximum liability or to withdraw from the Convention altogether. Diplomatic efforts to satisfy American concerns by
negotiating an increase failed, because many countries believed the U.S. demands for a cap of $100,000 (or a temporary increase to $75,000 pending further negotiations) to
be excessive.47 As a result, the United States "denounced"
the Convention on November 15, 1965,48 meaning that the
Convention would cease to bind the United States six
months later.49 In a last minute flurry, however, the United
States reached agreement on a compromise with all airlines
operating in the U.S. and withdrew its denunciation on May
13, 1966-two days before the final deadline, "final" because it is inconceivable that two-thirds of the Senate ever
would have consented to adhering to the Convention
50
anew.
This compromise is embodied in a contract signed by all
airlines which operate in the United States. The agreement
was filed with, and approved by, the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB). The United States is not a party to the agreement, nor are any other countries. Thus, the Agreement
Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention
and the Hague Protocol-commonly known as the Monless this country also happens to be one of the four sites for litigation permitted by
Article 28. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 522-26.
46 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 532, 578-86.
47 Id. at 551-52.
48 Id.
49 Warsaw
-o

Convention, supra note 13, art. 39.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at

570-75, 587-90.
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treal Agreement5 1-cannot
be regarded as a treaty,
although it modifies the provisions of the Warsaw Convention for the purposes of its implementation in the United
States.52
In the Montreal Agreement, the airlines waived the
$8,300 damage cap, setting instead a higher limit of
$75,000. This change can be reconciled with the Warsaw
Convention by regarding it as a "special contract" establishing a higher damage cap pursuant to Article 22(1) .5 The
airlines also waived, their defenses of taking "all necessary
measures" and of impossibility. 4 Thus, the Montreal
Agreement moves beyond the Convention's shift in the burden of proof towards strict liability, 55 leaving only the defense of comparative negligence.56
The Montreal Agreement, however, is limited in scope.
It only applies to flights where the United States is the place
of departure or destination, or a planned stop en route.
Therefore, it does not apply to American citizens traveling
between two foreign countries or to passengers on flights
which crash in the United States without intending to stop
here. In these cases, different (and, in reality, always lower)
damage caps apply. The exact rules would depend on
which protocols5 7 the relevant countries had signed. Thus,
CAB Agreement 18900, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), reprintedin U.S.C.S.

CONVEN-

TIONS 549-52 (Law. Co-op. 1983) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
52 See Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 549 (1991).
See. also Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 601 (concluding "that almost overnight, and without
normal constitutional and legislative processes, the character of a major international treaty changed completely"). The anomalous character of the Montreal
Agreement was relevant to the Supreme Court's determination of liability in Korean
Air Lines. See discussion infra part V.B.
5 Warsaw Convention, supra note 13, art. 22(1).
- Id. art. 20(1).
M Indeed, several American courts have characterized the Montreal regime as
"absolute liability." See, e.g., Sheris v. The Sheris Co., 188 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 878 (1972). The Supreme Court, however, has pronounced that
this "characterization is not entirely accurate.... [The liability is] 'absolute' only in
the sense that an airline cannot'defend a claim on the ground that it took all necessary measures to avoid injury." Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 406 (1985).
5 Warsaw Convention, supra note 13, art. 21.
57The protocols to the Warsaw Convention are: Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air,
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it can be argued that the "Warsaw system" (consisting of the
Warsaw Convention, the subsequent protocols, and the
Montreal Agreement) defeats the very purpose of the original Convention: uniformity. The different rules resulting
from the various protocols and, importantly, the Montreal
Agreement, may require courts to answer the conflicts of
law questions the Convention sought to avoid."
The Montreal Agreement has influenced U.S. implementation of the Convention in personal injury and wrongful
death cases for nearly thirty years. It has proved remarkably
long-lived for an agreement, born of the necessity of a
deadline, originally known as the Montreal Interim Agreement.5 9

Understandably, frustration with the Montreal

Agreement's damage cap has grown over time, as other tort
remedies have skyrocketed. Indeed, the Montreal Agreement even fell short of the U.S. goals back in 1966.60 These
frustrations have fueled periodic efforts since 1966 to modopened for signatureSept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter Hague Protocol];
Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1919, as Amended by the
Protocol Done at The Hague on Sept. 28, 1955, done Mar. 8, 1971, ICAO Doc. No.
8932 (1971) [hereinafter Guatemala City Protocol], reprinted in 65 AM.J. INT'L L. 670
(1971); and the Additional Protocols Amending the Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, done Sept. 25, 1975,
ICAO Document Nos. 9145-9148 [hereinafter Montreal Protocols], reviewed in Marian Nash Leich, CurrentDevelopment: The MontrealProtocolsto the Warsaw Convention on
InternationalCarriageby Air, 76 AM.J. INT'L L. 412 (1982). The United States signed

the Hague Protocol in 1956, the Guatemala City Protocol in 1971, and the third and
fourth Montreal Protocols in 1975, but the Senate has not consented to any of them.
See infra note 59. Only the Hague Protocol is presently in force among its signatories
and it seems unlikely the others will ever become effective unless the United States
ratifies them. See SPEISER & K.AuSE, supra note 15, at 681 & n.35.

58Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 568-69. They offer a partial defense to these criticisms: "a loss of some uniformity was better than what many expected to ensue [from U.S. denunciation of the Convention]i-general chaos." Id. at
569.
-9 CAB Order, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), reprinted in U.S.C.S. CowNvirrloNs 549,
551 (Law. Co-op. 1983); see also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 601-02.
6 The United States originally described the Agreement as a "provisional arrangement" pending negotiation of an "international agreement on limits of liability for
international transportation in the area of $100,000 per passenger or on uniform
rules without any limit of liability." CAB Order, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), reprinted
in U.S.C.S. CONvNrIONs 549, 551 (Law. Co-op 1983). See generally Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 563-75 (discussing the proceedings of the Montreal
Conference).
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ify the Warsaw system further. Most recently, the Clinton
Administration endorsed ratification of the Montreal Protocols," l which would raise the liability limit to approximately
$138,000.62 The Protocols also expressly permit each signatory to establish a supplemental compensation plan for additional damages.63
III.

TREATY INTERPRETATION

The Warsaw Convention is a treaty. The United States
entered it through the procedures required by both international law and the U.S. Constitution. It now has the sta64
tus of a treaty in both international and domestic law.
When hearing international air disaster cases, therefore,
American judges must never forget that it is a treaty they are
expounding 6 5 -not domestic legislation. While treaty interpretation is fundamentally the same as interpreting any
61 David Field, Clinton Proposalto Ease Claims in Airline DisastersDraws Praise WASH.
TIMs,Jan. 10, 1994, at A19. Past efforts to ratify Warsaw Convention protocols have
consistently fallen short of the two-thirds vote needed in the Senate for consent.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In particular, the Senate rejected the Montreal Protocols in 1983 by a 50-42 vote for consent. Trans World Airways v. Franklin Mint, 466
U.S. 243, 250 n.18 (1984). For a discussion of the difficulties (intended by the Foun-

ders) in obtaining Senate consent to treaties, see Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 130 n.4, 132-33 & n.12 (1972) [hereinafter HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS].
6 Recognizing

the demise of the gold standard, the international community set
the Protocol's damage cap at 100,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDR), a "basket" of
currencies used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). According to the IMF,
"The value of the U.S. dollar in terms of the SDR is the reciprocal of the sum of the
dollar values, based on the market exchange rates, of specified quantities of the U.S.
dollar, Deutsc[h]e mark, French franc, Japanese yen, and pound sterling." 47 IN'r'L
FIN. STATISTICS 4 (Feb. 1994). The $138,000 figure used for the Protocol's damage
cap in this article is based on the average dollar value of the SDR in December,
1993. Id.
If the Senate were to consent to the Protocols, it would probably require, as a
condition of its consent, that the United States establish such a fund. See Leich,
supra note 55, at 416 (1982) (listing this requirement among the conditions set by
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations when it last considered the Protocols);
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON AVIATION SECURITY & TERRORISM, REPORT 106 (1990) (recommending ratification, coupled with a supplemental plan and negotiations to raise
the cap further); ThomasJ. Whalen, The Supplemental CompensationPlan to the Warsaw
Convention, 11 LLOYD'S AViATION LAW 2, 3-4 (Aug. 1, 1992).
64 See discussion infra part VA
6
Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
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other document, its international character demands a certain sensitivity.
Most importantly, judges should ensure that their approach to treaty interpretation is consistent with that established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 6 or, better yet, they should rely on the Vienna Convention as
a tool in interpreting other treaties. The United States
signed the Convention in 1970, but the Senate has not acted on it. Until it is entered through the procedures required by Article II of the Constitution, the Convention will
not be the "supreme law of the land" under Article VI. 67
Nevertheless, for several reasons, the Vienna Convention
is highly relevant to treaty interpretation by U.S. courts.
First, the Convention is widely recognized as the type of
treaty known as a "codification" of customary international
law,68 which the Supreme Court has held to be binding on
the United States.6 9 That is to say that the Vienna Convention describes existing international law, rather than creating new law. Second, the federal government accepts that
the Convention "is already recognized as the authoritative
guide to current treaty law and practice." 70 This view may
explain the Senate's lackadaisical response, i.e. there is no
-Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, UN Doc. A/Conf.
39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
67 Indeed, even if the United States had ratified the Vienna Convention, the Convention's own terms preclude its literal application to the Warsaw Convention, as it
only applies to later treaties. Id. art. 4. Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed in the
accompanying text, the Vienna Convention's principesare relevant to understanding
the Warsaw Convention. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw
OF THE UNITED STATES 146-47 nn.5-6 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
6 See Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw 387 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter
HENKIN, CASEBOOK]; Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 1971 I.CJ. 16, reprinted in HENKIN, CASEBOOK at 485, 486.

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). For a discussion of the arguments
for and against judicial reliance on customary international law, see generally Lea
Brilmayer, InternationalLaw in American Courts, 100 YALE LJ. 2277 (1991).
70 S. Exec. Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971), reprinted in TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Prt. 10353, at 318-28 (2d ed. 1993). See also Statement (unpublished) of Carl F. Salons,
Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee regarding the Convention on the Law of Treaties, Aug. 3, 1972, quoted in
id. at 20 (stating that the Vienna Convention is widely regarded as a "major achievement in the development and codification of international law").
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need to vote on a treaty the substance of which is already
binding.71 Third, the Restatement (Third) on the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which is persuasive authority to
American courts, bases its rules for treaty interpretation on
the Vienna Convention.72 Finally, there is some judicial
precedent for relying on the Convention.73
For all these reasons, American judges should rely on the
Vienna Convention when interpreting treaties. Accordingly, this article evaluates the validity of judicial interpretations of the Warsaw Convention by their consistency with
the approach required by the Vienna Convention.
A.

ARTICLE 31(1)

The most relevant provision of the Vienna Convention is
Article 31 (1), which provides: "A treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose. 7 Article 31(1) therefore mandates that the'Warsaw Convention should be inter71 The Vienna Convention has also been caught in a constitutional controversy
unrelated to its merits over which other international agreements must be submitted
to the Senate for consent. The Foreign Relations Committee approved the Vienna
Convention, but attached as a condition an "understanding" unacceptable to the
Executive, so the full Senate never acted on the Convention. Id. at 21-25.
72 See RESTATEMENT (THRD), supra note 67, § 325, cmL a, rptr. note 4 (1986) (revealing a certain tension about the extent to which the Vienna Convention should
be regarded as customary law binding on the United States).
73 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 n.5 (1982) (referring to Article 2
as evidence that international law does not distinguish between treaties and other
international agreements); Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350,
1361 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds sub nom Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (applying Article 32 to the United Nations Convention
on the Status of Refugees); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33, 36 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976) (applying Article 31 to the Warsaw Convention); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 707 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff'd 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973) (same); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252,
1261 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying Article 36 to the High Seas Convention); Hyosung v.
Japan Airlines, 624 F. Supp. 727, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying Article 40 to the
Warsaw Convention); Acrilocos v. Regan, 617 F. Supp. 1082, 1086-87 (C.I.T. 1985)
(arguing for reliance on the Vienna Convention when construing treaties and applying Article 31 to a trade agreement with Mexico).
74 Cf Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699-700 (1988)
(setting forth a general approach to treaty construction); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967) (same, following RESTATEMENT (SEC
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preted, consistently with the ordinary meaning of its terms,
to give effect to its basic purposes of uniformity and certainty. 75 Concern for the purpose of a treaty should not be
taken so far, however, as to lose the primary emphasis on
the ordinary meaning of the terms themselves.76
The interpretation of a treaty with the purpose of establishing international uniformity raises certain complications." Article 31(1) obligates American judges to
interpret the Warsaw Convention in "good faith," based on
the "ordinary meaning" of the terms given their "context"
and "object and purpose" as they see it. Yet, the purpose of
uniformity would be defeated if American judges interpreted the treaty (substantially) differently from the interpretations given in Argentina, Britain, or China.78 So, while
OND) ON THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES),

905 (1968).

CeM. den d, 392 U.S.

75 Cf.Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 711 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting
Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331-32 (1912) (The Court has a "duty to read the
[treaty] 'with a view to effecting the objects and purposes of the States thereby contracting.' ")); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 546 n.1' (1991); Reed v.
Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1087-1092 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); see also
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985) ("[I]t is our responsibility to give the
specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the
contracting parties.") (quoting Reed, 555 F.2d at 1090).
76 This approach seeks to find the object and purpose of a treaty primarily in its
text-rather than in the drafters' subjective intent-so it may be characterized as
following the "effectiveness" principle of interpretation, as distinct from the teleological approach. That is, the object and purpose are to be used to give effect to the
treaty's text, not to depart therefrom. Indeed, when preparing the Vienna Convention, the International Law Commission believed the object and purpose of a treaty
would be found principally in its preamble. LAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 118, 130-31 (2d ed. 1984). Thus, if the Supreme Court had
made reference to the Vienna Convention, Article 31 might have helped resolve a
dispute in which the dissent accused the Court of having too much regard for the
purposes of the Warsaw Convention, at the expense of the text itself. See Trans
World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 277-78 & n.6, 283 n.13 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Other treaties promoting international uniformity among domestic legal regimes include the Uniform Copyright Convention and the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods. See generaly V. Susanne Cook, Note, The
Need For Uniform Interpretationof the UnitedNations Convention on the InternationalSale of
Goods, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 197 (1988) (relying on the Vienna Convention as the basis
for interpretation and comparing Warsaw Convention cases).
7 For a list of signatories to the Convention, see U.S.C.S. CONVENTIONS 548 (Law.
Co-op. 1983). For a comparative discussion of the Warsaw Convention's implementation by the courts of several signatory countries, see GEORGETTE MILLER, LIABILIrY
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Article 31's "good faith" surely requires the exercise of independent judgement, it also obligates American judges to
consider the interpretations of other state-parties. Indeed,
a unanimous Supreme Court recognized in a Warsaw Convention case that "the opinions of our sister signatories [are]
entitled to considerable weight."79 American courts should
reconcile U.S. and foreign interpretations when possible
and explain why another state's view is being rejected when
not,80 but the United States is not bound by foreign interpretations."' The Warsaw Convention cases reveal that
American courts sometimes consider foreign interpretations, 2 though not in a regular or systematic way. Thus,
the domestic implementation of a multilateral uniform
code can be seen as a grand federalist scheme, analogous
perhaps to U.S. Circuit Courts' responsibility to consider
(but not to follow) the views of other circuits.
Indeed, the purpose of uniformity raises more familiar
problems as well. For the United States to participate in a
uniform international regime, the Warsaw Convention
must be interpreted (reasonably) uniformly by American
courts 3 -both federal and state.8 4 This requirement for
IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT:

THE WARSAW SYSTEM IN MUNICIPAL COURTS

(1977). Millet's comparative study seeks to promote uniformity in interpretation,
because "[d]ivergent interpretations of a uniform text will in fact annihilate the unification achieved in principle." Id. at 1.
79 Saks, 470 U.S. at 404 (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d
913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978)). Cf.Royd, 499 U.S. at 550-51 ("We must also consult the
opinions of our sister signatories.... [to which] deference [is] owed."); 30 Hogsheads
of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) (Marshall, CJ.).
soSee F/oyd 499 U.S. at 550-51 (considering, and rejecting, Israeli Supreme
Court's interpretation of lision corporelle in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention).
81Jesse Lewis (The David J. Adams) Claim (U.S. v. Grt. Br.), 6 U.N.R.I.A.A. 85
(1921) (arbitral tribunal held that the "fundamental principle of the juridical equality of states" prevents one party to a treaty from being bound by the judicial interpretations of another party), reprinted in HENKIN, CASEBOOK, supra note 68, at 440, 441.
82 See, e.g., Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 918-19 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); FranklinMin4 466 U.S. 243, 257-58 & n.31;
Saks, 470 U.S. at 404; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 67, § 325, rptr. n.4.
See In reAir Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d 1267, 1274 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Rein v. Pan Am. World Airways, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991) ("uniformity has national
as well as international application"); Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 737 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1984) ("uniformity has both an
international and intranational application"), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 469 U.S.
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the uniform interpretation of a treaty is akin to the ordinary
view of a single federal law in interpreting statutes, 85 except
that the failure is particularly acute where the very purpose
of the treaty is to establish uniformity. Thus, it is interesting that the DC Circuit announced a major development in
the responsibilities of one appeals court towards the contrary precedents of another as a result of a difference with
the Second Circuit over the proper interpretation of the
Warsaw Convention.86
B.

ARTICLE

32

Article 32 of the Vienna Convention establishes rules for
the use of drafting histories (travaux priparatoires)in interpreting treaties, allowing "recourse . . . to supplementary
means of interpretation . . . to determine the meaning
when the interpretation according to article 31 ... [is] ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a result which is manifestly
absurd or unreasonable."8 7 The Restatement (Third) indi-

cates that Article 32 reflects a compromise between states
that rely on legislative histories when constructing statutes
1186 (1985); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 337-38 (5th
Cir. 1967) ("A multilateral treaty is rather like a 'uniform law' within the United
States."), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); Thomas M. Franck, The Courts, the State
Department and National Policy, 44 MINN. L. REv. 1101, 1103 (1960) ("[A] state which
does not speak with a single voice or, at least, with a single mind, cannot address
itself effectively to any problem of international law.").
See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 474 (U.S. 1793) (Op. ofJay, C.J.); Vienna
Convention, supra note 66, art. 29; HENVIN, CASEBOOK, supra note 68, at 526 n.6 ("A

federal state is also responsible for the fulfillment of treaty obligations in its entire
territory irrespective of internal division of powers."); cf. HENviN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
supra note 61, at 129 n.3 (quoting Madison at the Constitutional Convention).
- See H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 928 (1963).
- See discussion infra part IV.B.
87 Article 32 reflects the Permanent Court of International Justice's view that
"there is no occasion to have regard to preparatory work if the text of a convention
is sufficiently clear in itself." The S.S. Lotus, P.C.IJ., Ser. A., No. 10, at 16 (1927).
While many notable authorities attacked the Lotus decision, arguing for "quasi-habitual" resort to the travaux prparatoires,the international community retained the
traditional view codifying the law of treaties in the Vienna Convention. MYRES S.
McDouGAL, HAROLD S. LASswELL &JAMES C. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER,

122-32 (1967).
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and other states that do not."8 Thus, international law tolerates less frequent resort to travaux priparatoiresfor treaty
interpretation than many American judges rely on legislative history.8 9
The Supreme Court appeared to recognize this principle
when it declared: "When interpreting a treaty, we begin
with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used. Other general rules of construction
may be brought to bear on difficult or ambiguous

passages." 90 Yet, the Court has also stated, without qualification, "In interpreting a treaty it is proper, of course, to
refer to the records of its drafting and negotiation."9 ' Accordingly, many U.S. courts have engaged in lengthy analyses of the travaux priparatoires without making any
determination that recourse to 92such supplementary means

of interpretation was necessary.
*Nor is the approach of the American conservative reaction-adherents to the so-called "plain meaning" ruleconsistent with international law. In Chan v. KAL, for ex-

8 British courts, for example, will not consider legislative history when construing
Acts of Parliament, but the House of Lords has endorsed cautious resort to travaux
prparatoireswhen interpreting treaties. Fothergill v. Monarch Lines, (1981) A.C.
251 (considering the minutes of the Hague Conference of 1955 to interpret the
Warsaw Convention as modified by the Hague Protocol), quoted in LAN SINCLMAR, THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATiES 144-47 (2d ed. 1984).
89 Nevertheless, the International Court of Justice seems to rely on travaux
priparatoires more frequently than Article 32 authorizes. RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 67, § 325, cmts. e, g, rptr. notes 1, 4; see also HENKIN, CASEBOOK, supra note
68, at 447-48 & 448 n.1.
- Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699-700 (1988)
(citations omitted). See also Floyd, 499 U.S. at 593.
9' Saks, 470 U.S. at 400. See also Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386
F.2d 323, 336 (5th Cir. 1967) (arguing that American courts must always "consider[ ]
the conception, parturition, and growth of the [C]onvention," even where the text
appears "unambiguous"), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
" See, e.g., Saks, 470 U.S. at 400. Quoting Article 32, Justice Blackmun once reproved the Court's excessive "[r]eliance on a treaty's negotiating history (travaux
prparatoires),"describing such reliance as "a disfavored alternative of last resort."
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2571 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The court below had also relied on Article 32 to limit reliance on the
travauxpr paratoires..969 F.2d 1350, 1361 (2d Cir. 1992). For a better approach, see
Royd 499 U.S. at 542 (concluding that an alternative interpretation was "plausible,
and the term is both ambiguous and difficult" before considering "additional aids to
construction").
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ample, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, rejected reference to the travaux priparatoireswhere "the result the text
produces is not necessarily absurd."9 3 Justice Scalia's approach parallels the Vienna Convention's "manifestly absurd or unreasonable" test, but disallows reference to the
travaux priparatoiresin cases where the meaning is "ambiguous or obscure." Apparently believing that if the result is
"not necessarily absurd," the "text is clear," the Court concluded, "We must thus be governed by the text... whatever
conclusions might be drawn from the intricate drafting history....
"94
The Court thus persisted with a "plain meaning" approach, refusing to consider the travaux
prparatoires-eventhough the two sentences of text at issue
embody an obvious tension.95 Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion rightly criticized the Court for its "self-affixed
blindfold that prevents the Court from examining anything
beyond the treaty language itself."96 But the concurrence
may have erred by relying on the travauxpriparatoiresmore
than Article 32 authorizes.9 7
Thus, both the Court and the concurrence erred by applying tests derived from their general approaches to the
use of legislative history in construing domestic legislation.
Apparently, neither opinion considered whether different
Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989).
- Id. Contrary to the assertion in the accompanying text, Justice Scalia does state
that the drafting history "may of course be consulted to elucidate a text that is ambiguous." Id. (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 392, though not quite accurately). The context of that statement, however, makes clear thatJustice Scalia believes a text is only
'ambiguous" if its result is "necessarily absurd." In essence, his approach collapses
Article 32's first prong into the second. Vienna Convention, supra note 66, art. 32.
95 The first sentence of Article 3(2) of the Warsaw Convention states that an "irregularity" in the "passenger ticket" does not waive the damage cap. "Nevertheless,"
the second sentence expressly waives the damage cap if a "carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered." The text fails to address an
important question: when is a ticket so defective that one cannot describe it as an
"irregular[ ]" "passenger ticket" but must instead conclude that no "passenger
ticket," as defined in Article 3(1), was ever "delivered"? When judges must draw a
line between such obviously conflicting textual provisions, they should be able to
consult the travaux prparatoiresfor guidance as to where to draw that line. For further discussion of Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention, see discussion infa part V.B.
- Chan, 490 U.S. at 136, 138 n.5, 141.
97 Id. at 137-47.
91
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rules govern in an international context. Such failures by
American judges could embarrass the United States in international fora. If American judges apply domestic principles on the use of drafting history rather than the
international standards embodied in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, "an international tribunal might find the
United States interpretation erroneous and United States
action pursuant to that interpretation a violation of the
agreement."98
C.

FRENCH TEXT

The Warsaw Convention was negotiated, written and authenticated in French." The use of a single language furthers "uniformity of interpretation, which was one of the
paramount objectives of the Convention."100

The State Department translated the Convention into
English, but the translation is unofficial and President
Roosevelt made the French version of the treaty. 101 While
the English version is relevant to understanding the Senate's understanding of the Convention, the French version
is binding U.S. law.1 1 2 Therefore, while judges may use the
English text generally for convenience, they have an obligaNRESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 67, § 325, cmt. g. See also HENKIN, FoREIGN
AFFAi, supra note 61, at 167 & n.128. The problems posed by U.S. overreliance on
travaux ptiparatoiresare compounded by the Supreme Court's determination that
the views of U.S. negotiators are "entitled to great weight." Socit6 Nationale Industrielle AMrospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 536 n.19 (1987).
An international tribunal, plainly, would not give "great weight" to the views of any
one negotiating delegation. Indeed, were the courts of each signatory to defer to its
own negotiators' views, the resulting discrepancies would destroy by interpretation
the uniformity the signatories achieved by diplomacy.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 13, art. 36.
100 Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1082 n.5 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922
(1977).
10, President Roosevelt officially proclaimed U.S. adherence to the convention
"done at Warsaw, in the French language, October 12, 1929" printed "word for
word" (in French) in the Proclamation. Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000,
3013. The unofficial English translation follows the Proclamation. Id. at 3014.
Ift See Saks, 470 U.S. at 397 (calling French the "governing text of the Convention"). See also Lawrence B. Goldhirsch, The Warsaw Convention Annotated 178
(1988) (discussing British, Swiss and New Zealand cases giving precedence to the
French text of the Convention).
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law° 0 3 -to

consider the
French text.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has declared: "we must consider [the text's] French legal meaning."10 5 This is particularly important where the French
concept is imperfectly captured by the English translation,
as is the case when Article 25's dol is translated as "willful
106
104

misconduct."

The role of the French text also means that the "plain
meaning" rule is ill-suited to interpretation of the Warsaw
103 Had the Senate consented to, and the President proclaimed, the English text,
that version would have been binding in domestic law. This would not have affected
American obligations under international law, however. Since the Convention was
authenticated in French, the French text is the binding version in international law.
Vienna Convention, supra note 66, art. 10. If the U.S. reliance on a translation led
to any discrepancies from the binding French, the United States would be in violation of its international obligations. Article 27 of the Vienna Convention precludes
the use of "internal law" as an excuse for a breach of treaty. This is why countries
often negotiate and write a treaty in several languages, each of which would then be
equally binding. Vienna Convention, supra note 66, art. 33; RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 67, § 325, cmt. f. U.S. policy now strongly favors authentication of all
treaties in English, with equal authentication in such other languages as are necessary. State Department Circular 175, §§ 723.5, 741, reprintedin TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Prt. 103-5,
at 307, 313 (2d ed. 1993). Even the Warsaw Convention's protocols have official
English texts, though-in deference to the original-the French text prevails in
case of discrepancies. See, e.g., Hague Protocol, supra note 57, art. 27. Of course, a
court interpreting a treaty authenticated in multiple languages should consider the
various texts and strive to "conform[ ]" the interpretations "to each other." United
States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88-89 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.) (reversing an
earlier interpretation of the English text of a treaty in light of the Spanish text);
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1356 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd on
other grounds sub no. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2563-64
(1993) (interpreting "return" in Refuges Convention in light of French term
refouler).
104 Judges may satisfy this obligation in several ways which accommodate
their
convenience. The Supreme Court once presented the bulk of the text in English,
only using French for the terms in dispute. Royd, 499 U.S. at 536. Likewise, the KAL
court, after completing its analysis in English, "satisfied [itself] that 'damage sustained' ... is an accurate translation of 'dommage survenu.'" In re KAL, 932 F.2d at
1486.
ift Saks, 470 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added); see also floyd, 499 U.S. at 535-36. The
Court errs, however, by suggesting that the obligation to consider the French text
derives from the fact that "the [Warsaw] Convention was drafted in French by continentaljurists." Id. at 536. Rather, the obligation exists in international law because
the Convention was authenticatedin French and in domestic law because the Convention was proclaimed in French. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
106See discussion infra part V.B.
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Convention, unless the judge argues that the meaning is
plain in French.1 1 7 Thus, the Supreme Court, per Justice
Scalia, erred by hinging its interpretation of Article 3(2) on
the definition of "irregularity" in Webster's Second International Dictionary, without referring to the definition of
l'irrigularitiin a French dictionary,108 even though the
Court had previously consulted French cases and
dictionaries.109
IV.

MASS TORT LITIGATION UNDER THE
WARSAW CONVENTION

The international community intended the Warsaw Convention to serve as a tool in resolving aviation litigation.
Secretary of State Hull declared its "tend [ency] to lessen litigation" to be one of its primary advantages.'1
It 'soon became clear, however, that the Convention had
failed in this regard. Therefore, improving its usefulness in
"lessen [ing] litigation" has consistently been one of the
United States primary objectives in'subsequent negotiations.' 1 ' For example, as early as the Hague Conference of
1955, the United States advocated a "settlement inducement clause," 1 2 which the international community
10 The Second Circuit once used a French-English dictionary to interpret the
French text differently than the unofficial English translation would suggest and
concluded that its decision reflected the plain meaning in French. Reed v. Wiser,
555 F.2d 1079, 1084 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 922 (1977).
- Chan 490 U.S. at 128.
1- Saks, 470 U.S. at 396-402; see also Royd, 499 U.S. at 534-43.
110Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 499 (citing S. Exec. Doc. No. 6,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934)).
I See U.S. Department of State, Letter of Transmittal, S. Exec. Doc. B., 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. viii (1977) ("For nearly two decades, the United States has been in
the forefront in urging amendments to the Warsaw Convention ... to encourage
rapid settlement of claims at a fair level for Americans. The 1970 Presidential Statement on International Air Transportation Policy stated that the primary objectives
of the United States in the revision of the Warsaw Convention were 'certainty, speed,
and sufficiency of recovery by the injured party.' "). But see O'Rourke v. Eastern Air
Lines, 730 F.2d 842, 853-54 n.20 (2d Cir. 1984) (mistakenly citing Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, to support its assertion that the "speedy resolution of claims
Was apparently not an important United States objective at the [Montreal]
conference").
11 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 507.
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adopted at Guatemala City in 1971.113 Similarly, the United
States has supported strict liability for carriers since 1965.114
And, as the discussion below shows, Washington's incessant
pressures to raise the damage cap'1 5 should also be characterized as efforts to "lessen litigation."
U.S. efforts led to the Montreal Agreement's movement
towards strict liability, the expected results being reduced
litigation, quicker settlements, and more valuable recoveries by plaintiffs.1 6 Speedy recovery was a primary objective: "settlement could begin immediately, without waiting
for accident investigations." 1 7 "Quicker and less expensive
settlements" would mean "less time and less money going
for litigation,

. .

. drastically reduc[ing]" attorney involve-

ment and fees, and avoiding "delay, [the need for] accident
investigation at remote locations, [and] complex conflict of
law questions."" 8 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn even went so
far as to speculate whether air crash claims would be "handled like health or life insurance claims-with forms and
perhaps interviews with the plaintiff and with the decedent's employer, but without any litigation." 1 9 They con"' Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 57, art. 8. "[T]he Guatemala City Protocol
contains a provision known as the 'settlement inducement clause,' which permits a
court to impose attorney's fees if the carrier has not within six months of a claim
involving passenger injury or death made an offer to settle at an amount at least
equal to the ultimate recovery." U.S. Department of State, Letter of Transmittal, S.
Exec. Doc. B., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. vi (1977).
14 According to Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, the U.S. delegation to the Montreal
Conference (which included both of them) regarded strict liability as a "substantial
benefit to passengers in terms of speed and certainty of recovery and probably reduction of legal expenses as well. Not only in litigated cases but more importantly in
settlement talks elimination of the issue of fault was likely to work in the claimant's
favor." Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 571.
113 In 1955, the United States advocated a liability limit of $25,000, but had to
settle for $16,600. Hague Protocol, supra note 57, art. 11; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 25, at 506-09. In 1965, the U.S. sought a protocol raising the limit to
$100,000, but only achieved $75,000 in the Montreal Agreement, supra note 51.
Under U.S. pressure, the international community increased the damage cap to
$100,000 in 1971 and to $138,000 in 1975. Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 57,
art. 8; Montreal Protocol No. 3, supra note 57, art. 2.
116Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 587.
17 Id. at 593.
I's Id. at 600-01.
11 Id. at 600.
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cluded that "the success of the [Montreal Agreement] will
depend on the accuracy of the prediction that cases will be
120
settled quickly and economically."
A.

THE WEINSTEIN TEST

Applying a standard developed by Judge Weinstein1 21 to
measure the success of mass torts resolution shows that the
Montreal Agreement has fallen short of Lowenfeld and
Mendelsohn's high hopes. Judge Weinstein describes the
five "equities"-"the concrete issues of fact and fairness of
the particular situation... [to be considered] in fashioning
remedies" in a mass torts case. These are:
1) fairly and expeditiously compensating numerous victims,
and
2) deterring wrongful conduct where possible, while
3) preventing overdeterrence in mass torts from shutting
down industry or removing needed products from the
market,
4) keeping the courts from becoming paralyzed by tens or
even hundreds of thousands of repetitive personal injury
cases, and
5) reducing transactional costs of compensation. 122
The Weinstein test embodies an obvious tension between
equities #2 and #3. A platonic judge equally motivated by
both equities would set damages at the ideal level where
wrongful conduct is deterred, but legitimate conduct is not.
The Warsaw Convention recognizes this tension. Article 22
protects the aviation industry from "shutting down" by setting a fixed damage cap in order to depress insurance costs
and in turn ticket prices. Article 25 deters "wrongful conduct," however, by waiving the damage cap for dol (i.e. "willful misconduct").
1
12

d.

Jack B. Weinstein, a federal judge in the Eastern District of New York since

1967, is widely regarded as a leading authority on mass tort cases. He has presided
over cases involving, inter alia, air crashes, asbestos, and Agent Orange.
2 Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law,
1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 269, 274.
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The other three equities seek efficiency through consolidation, speed, and avoidance of duplication-in a word, efficiency. While not so obviously embedded in the
Convention's text as are equities #2 and #3, the other three
equities are also present. Plaintiffs benefit from Article 17's
presumption of airline liability or, better yet, the Montreal
Agreement's strict liability. Taken together, Articles 17 and
22 constitute the Convention's "essential bargain." 12 3 In a
regime where the defendant is strictly liable for compensatory damages up to a low amount, there should be little to
litigate. Only the extent of damages (up to the limit) must
still be proven; but with today's tort law it should be relatively straightforward to show that the victim of an air disaster suffered damages worth at least $75,000.124 Thus, the
essential bargain creates strong incentives to settle aviation
litigation. Settlement is the fastest, fairest, least burdensome, least expensive, and, therefore, the most equitable
means of resolving mass tort litigation.
Yet, as the lengthy Pan Am and KAL litigation shows, the
system has not worked. The parties did not settle, but instead found matters to litigate. This failure has occurred
despite the fact that airplane crashes, as single event disasters, are among the easiest mass torts to resolve: causality is
easy to prove (and the Convention even eliminates the
need to prove it); the injuries of all potential plaintiffs are
proximate in time and space; there is an overwhelming
commonality of fact, so discovery (to the extent it is necessary at all) is much simplified; there is a single defendant;
and since only passengers (or, in wrongful death cases,
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 500.
Cf Windbourne v. Eastern Air Lines, 479 F. Supp. 1130, 1141 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
(discussing the carrier's liability for damages proven up to $75,000), rievd, 632 F.2d
219 (2d Cir. 1980). It should be noted, however, that in the 1960s the damage cap
of $75,000 was high enough that it might have required litigation over lost expected
wages to determine the actual damages to be received. Indeed, the cap was sufficiently high when coupled with strict liability that Robert Kennedy denounced it as
"highly dangerous," and the Air Line Pilots Association feared it would impede investigations by creating "sufficient incentive for psychotics to plant bombs aboard
airliners without purchasing additional insurance." Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra
note 25, at 592.
"

124
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their heirs)12 5 may sue under the Convention, all the potential plaintiffs are readily identifiable. 26 The failure has also
occurred despite the additional benefits of the Multidistrict
Litigation Act, 12 7 under which virtually all air crash litigation has been consolidated, and has remained128consolidated, without remand to the transferor districts.
While it is true that the Pan Am and KAL cases raised the
question of dol, which both the Convention and the Weinstein equities recognize as a potential source of litigation,
the system's troubles run far wider and deeper than the
foreseeable difficulties in implementing Article 25. The
root of the trouble is that the Convention
shortshrifts eq29
uity #1: it sets the damage cap too low.'

As a result, plaintiffs-believing that the Convention
weighs defendant's interests (equity #3) more heavily than
their own interests (equities #1 and #2)-have chosen to
litigate rather than settle at the Montreal limits. The litigation frequently raises questions based on Article 25 (equity
#2),'1° but plaintiffs have found numerous other avenues as
2 The Convention leaves it to the court to determine according to its own law,
including its choice of law rules, who may bring a wrongful death action. Warsaw
Convention, supra note 13, art. 24(2).
2
SeeJack B. Weinstein, PreliminaryReflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11
COLUM.J. ENvrL. L. 1, 6-7 (1986).
127 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988 & Supp. 1993). As the discussion infra part IV.B.
reveals, however, the handling of air disaster litigation would be much worse without
the Multidistrict Litigation Act.
12 See WiNDLE TuRLu
, AVIATION LrrIGATIoN §§ 12.01, 12.02, 12.03, 12.06 (1986 &
Supp. 1993). The Lockerbie and KAL cases remained consolidated for determina-

tions that the carriers had committed "willful misconduct" responsible for the disasters. The KAL cases were then transferred back to their original districts to set
damages, but were subsequently consolidated again to resolve KAL's motion for a
new trial on liability. In reKAL, 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. CL
616 (1991); In re KAL, 1994 WL 143009 (J.P.M.L. Apr. 12, 1994). When litigation is
completed concerning the damage awards for three Lockerbie victims, whose cases
will establish "the law of the case" regarding damages, the other Lockerbie actions
may be returned to their original districts too. See Pagnucco v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 1994 WL 498454 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 1994).
- See Russell Weintraub, Methods ForResolving Conflict of Laws Problems in Mass Tort
Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 129, 143 (criticizing the Warsaw Convention as "[t]he
wrong way to unify liability law so as to simplify litigation of mass torts," because the
damage cap is too low).
-20Article 25 may be the single most litigated article in air disasters. See discussion infra part V.B. One may thus regard Article 25 as the cause of avoidable litiga-
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well. Manyjudges have agreed that the Convention's imbalance creates inequities, and have used their equitable powers to restore balance-sometimes at the expense of the
Convention.1 3 1 The existence of such favorable precedents,
of course, also dissuades subsequent plaintiffs from settling,
thereby even further thwarting the Convention's intended
system. 132
tion, in which case potential remedies are available. Article 25 could be deleted,
creating an "unbreakable" damage cap (presumably set higher than the current
level) and eliminating all issues to litigate other than determination of damages up
to the cap. Thus, the Montreal Protocols would establish an unbreakable limit of
approximately $138,000.
Alternatively, Article 22 could be removed, eliminating the damage cap and,
therefore, the need to litigate to escape it. See CAB Order, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966),
reprinted in Warsaw Convention U.S.C.S. CONVENTIONS, app. at 549, 551 (Law. Co-op.
1983) (announcing the U.S. goal in future aviation negotiations as "international
agreement on limits of liability in the area of $100,000 per passenger or on uniform
rules without any limit of liability"); Editor's Note, 11 LLov's AVIATION LAw 1, 2 (Aug.
1, 1992) [hereinafter Editor's Note].
The choice between possible remedies would depend on how one balances the
equities. Both approaches further equities #4 and #5, while eliminating the damage
cap emphasizes #1 and #2 and the "unbreakable" damage cap serves #3.
The approaches may also be combined: The Clinton Administration has endorsed both ratifying the Montreal Protocols to raise the damage cap and establishing a passenger-funded Supplemental Compensation Plan to cover all compensatory
damages above the cap. See Montreal Protocol No. 3, supra note 57, art. 9 (incorporating the earlier protocols); Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 57, art. 14 (expressly permitting signatories to establish supplemental compensation schemes).
While this approach preserves Article 22 itself, it nevertheless eliminates the need
for escape. Once again, determination of damages would remain the only outstanding issue to litigate. By compensating passengers from a source other than the airlines, this approach serves equities #1 and #3, but not #2. The government could
promote equity #2 by imposing fines or other penalties (e.g. suspending a carrier's
license or criminal punishment of responsible employees) to deter wrongful conduct, but the money raised by such fines could not be donated to the supplemental
compensation plan. Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 57, art. 14.
"I See discussion infra part V.
132A similar analysis could also be conducted usingJudge Weinstein's parallel list
of seven goals for a scheme to manage mass tort litigation: 1) concentration of decision-making authority before one or a few judges; 2) a single forum; 3) a single
substantive law; 4) adequate judicial support facilities; 5) reasonable fact-finding
procedures; 6) a damage cap, including limits on punitive damages and pain and
suffering, and a method of allocating damages among several defendants; and 7) a
single distribution plan. Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural and Substantive Problems in Complex Litigation Arising from Disasters, 5 TouRo L. RE,. 1, 8-10 (1988).
The effective implementation of these seven goals would allow for results in accordance with the five equities. Indeed, a system which implemented the goals
would be well-suited to encourage settlement, the solution which best satisfies the
five equities.
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UNIFORMITY AMONG CONNECTED CASES

For all its shortcomings, the current system for resolving
air disaster litigation in the United States has generally

managed to avoid even worse results. A treaty intended to
promote uniformity requires, at the very minimum, that
plaintiffs who suffered identical injuries on the same flight
have. their cases decided under the same law. 133 The
United States surely fails its most basic obligation in implementing the Convention whenever such similarly-situated
plaintiffs receive different judgments merely because they
sued in different district courts which interpreted the Convention differently. Credit for minimizing such disparities
is due to Congress, for passing the Multidistrict Litigation
Act, and to the courts, for their implementation of the Act.
1.

Multidistrict Consolidation

The Multidistrict Litigation Act authorizes the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to consolidate separate
The Warsaw Convention itself provides for several of these goals: #3, a single substantive law (i.e. uniformity); #5, the essential bargain minimizes the need for factfinding; #6, a damage cap (which has been interpreted to exclude punitive, but not
pain and suffering damages, even in cases of willful misconduct). See discussion
infra part V.C. The Multidistrict Litigation Act, which complements the Convention
and assists its domestic implementation, additionally provides for goals #1, a single
judge, and #2, a single forum. Judges could benefit from additional resources (#4)
in their efforts to interpret the Convention, see discussion infra part VI., but this does
not appear to affect (except indirectly) the fundamental problem of discouraging
settlements. And distribution of the judgment (#7) does not raise many problems in
an air disaster where, unlike asbestos litigation, all of the victims and all of their
damages have been identified before the judgment is rendered. Thus, the Convention, in combination with the Multidistrict Litigation Act, would appear to be welldesigned to satisfy Judge Weinstein's goals, yet it has failed for the reasons discussed
in the accompanying text.
- Regrettably, a caveat must be added to this sentence: Two passengers on the
same flight will only have their cases decided under the same law where both are
subject to the Convention. The Convention only applies to "international" flights,
and the term is defined such that one passenger may be "international" but not
another on the same flight. See supra note 19. Even two "international" passengers
may have different statuses under the Convention, depending on whether they are
travelling one-way, round-trip, or through third countries. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 500-01, 503, 511 & n.58. These defects in the Convention do
not affect the basic point: The United States must treat similarly-situated plaintiffs
subject to the Convention uniformly.
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claims involving similar questions of law or fact before a Single district court of its choosing. Almost all major air
crashes have been consolidated; indeed almost 20% of the
34
Panel's cases have involved airplanes.1
In the case of an air disaster, one cannot question the
decision to consolidate. The presence of a single defendant sued by numerous plaintiffs in various districts asking
identical questions of law based on a single set of facts airgues strongly for consolidation. As the Panel declared
when consolidating the forty-two actions then pending
against KAL, consolidation would
best serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and
promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation....
[Consolidation] is thus necessary in order to eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, and
conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel, and the
judiciary."3 5
Consolidation is especially important in Warsaw Convention cases. By bringing related claims from the same flight
to a single forum, before a single judge, the Multidistrict
Litigation Act serves as an essential guarantor of the most
basic requirement of uniformity: decide cases arising from
the same crash under the same law.
Given the strong arguments favoring consolidation,
sometimes the only real question is where to consolidate.
In KAL, for example, actions were brought in eight districts1 36 and the various parties advocated consolidation in
five districts. 3 7 The Panel noted that none of the forums
§§ 12.01, 12.06.
135In re KAL, 575 F. Supp. 342, 343 J.P.M.L. 1983).
13 The breakdown of actions by district follows: Southern District of New York
(15), District of Columbia (8), Northern District of California (7), Eastern District of
New York (6), Eastern District of Michigan (3), Northern District of Illinois (1),
District of Massachusetts (1), District of New Jersey (1). Id.
,3, Defendant KAL moved to consolidate in the D.D.C., defendant Boeing crossmoved for consolidation in the Western District of Washington, and plaintiffs in
eleven actions cross-moved for consolidation in either the Southern or Eastern Districts of New York. Other than the movants and cross-movants, plaintiffs in twelve
actions and defendant the United States favored the D.D.C., plaintiffs in two actions
agreed with the cross-movant plaintiffs advocating the New York districts, plaintiffs
'34 TuRLuy, supra note 128,
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advocated "could be characterized as the nexus of this litigation involving an overseas air disaster," thereby depriving
the Panel of its primary test for-choosing consolidation sites
in airplane cases: the location of the accident. 3 8 Instead,
the Panel selected Washington for convenience in obtaining discovery from the federal government and because
the "litigation implicate[s] sensitive areas" of foreign
39
policy.1
The Panel's decision may well have been determinative
in this case because the district court' a re-evaluated and
ultimately rejected established Second Circuit precedent in
a way which would have been inconceivable (not to mention impermissible) for a court in either the Southern Dis4
trict of New York or the Eastern District of New York.' '
After the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
opinion,4 the Supreme Court granted certiorari 43 to resolve the resulting "circuit split"-thereby preserving uniformity in U.S. implementation of the Convention's
in seven actions and defendant Litton Industries favored the Southern District of
New York, and one plaintiff preferred consolidation in the Northern District of California. Id,
• 3 Absent "unusual circumstances" warranting a departure, "the situs of the crash
is generally the most appropriate transferee district." In re Mid-Air Collision near
Fairland, Indiana, 309 F. Supp. 621, 622-23 (J.P.M.L. 1970). See TuR.v, supra note
128, § 12.06.
13 In re KAL, 575 F. Supp. at 343.
140In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. 1463, 1474 (D.D.C. 1985).
141 A strong case could have been made for these fora: half of the actions were
pending there, plaintiffs in twenty actions and one defendant favored consolidation
there, KAL Flight #007 departed from Kennedy Airport in the Eastern District
(though the flight stopped in Alaska to refuel and discharge passengers before crossing the Pacific), and the Second Circuit courts (presumably because of the location
therein of Kennedy Airport and many airlines' corporate headquarters) have extensive experience with Warsaw Convention litigation. See In re Air Crash at Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 400 F. Supp. 1402, 1403 (J.P.M.L. 1975) (consolidating in
the district where most of the actions were pending); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
Uranium Contracts Litig., 405 F. Supp. 316, 319 (J.P.M.L. 1975) (consolidating in
the district preferred by most of the parties); In re Lockerbie, 709 F. Supp. 231, 232
(J.P.M.L. 1989) (consolidating in the E.D.N.Y, which includes the airport.where the
flight from Europe was destined to land, where the defendant airline's principal
place of business was located in the neighboring S.D.N.Y.).
142 In reKAL, 829 F.2d 1171, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
'4 Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 485 U.S. 986 (1988).
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damage cap. 44 The KAL case thus highlighted the
Supreme Court's role as the ultimate guarantor of uniformity within the United States. Yet, the Supreme Court hears
too few cases to regularly promote uniformity in air disaster
litigation. One of the primary advantages of the Multidistrict Litigation Act, therefore, is that consolidation minimizes the occurrence of splits demanding Supreme Court
review-and largely avoids the prospect of such splits in
connected cases arising from the same disaster.
Cases are only consolidated, however, for pre-trial determination of common issues and are sometimes returned to
their original districts for individual trials on damages. In
at least one air disaster, the circuits split on the proper measure of damages in a previously consolidated case. 145 Despite the serious threat to uniformity posed by this split, the
Supreme Court failed to resolve this issue.1 46 Also, in connected cases stemming from a single hijacking, several
courts reached opposing conclusions on the carrier's liabil1 47
ity for mental injuries unconnected with physical harm.
2. In re KAL: Does Van Dusen Govern Multidistrict
Consolidations?
Half of the actions consolidated in KAL were originally
filed in either the Eastern or Southern District of New York,
both in the Second Circuit.1 48 These plaintiffs could have
- See Chan, 490 U.S. 122. See discussion infra part V.B.
4 Compare Domangue v. Eastern Air Lines, 722 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1984)

(awarding plaintiffs pre- and postjudgment interest even though total damages exceed the damage cap) with O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, 730 F.2d 842, 845 (2d Cir.
1984) (holding that the Convention precludes interest awards where total damages
exceed the damage cap). On the merits of these cases, see discussion infra part V.C.
14 Mahfoud v. Eastern Air Lines, 479 F. Supp. 1130 (W.D. La. 1982), aff'd without
opinion, 729 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided court,
474 U.S. 213 (1985).
147 Compare Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1251 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (holding carrier liable) and Herman v. TWA, 314 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1974)

(holding carrier liable if mental injuries are manifested physically, e.g. by rash) with
Burnett v. TWA, 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (D.N.M. 1973) (holding carrier not liable).
The Supreme Court resolved this legal issue in an unrelated case. Floyd, 499 U.S.
530 (1991).
148 In re KAL, 575 F. Supp. 342, 343 (J.P.M.L. 1983).
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reasonably expected that their suits would follow the Second Circuit precedents which firmly established a certain
exception to the damage cap. 149 When their suits-were consolidated in the District for the District of Columbia, where
Judge Robinson rejected the Second Circuit precedents,
the New York plaintiffs appealed on two grounds. Not only
did they argue that the D.C. Circuit should adopt the Second Circuit rule, but thatJudge Robinson erred in applying
the opposite rule to them. These plaintiffs argued that their
actions should be governed by the law of their original jurisdiction, that the transferee court is obligated to apply the
law of the transferor court. This is the rule for state-federal
transfers established by the Supreme Court in Van Dusen v.
Barrack.'50 The Van Dusen Court declared that venue transfers in diversity actions result in "but a change of
courtrooms."' 5 '
The KAL appeals court 52 stated: "The question before us
is whether the Van Dusen rule-that the law applicable in
the transferor forum attends the transfer-should apply to
transferred federal claims."'"5 The court then declined to
apply Van Dusen to multidistrict consolidations for several
reasons. First, Van Dusen is part of the Erie"5 4 line of cases
on federalism, so "the Erie policies served by the Van Dusen
decision do not figure in the calculus when the law to be
applied is federal, not state." 155
Second, considerations of the nature of the federal judicial system mandate this result. The so-called "norm of independent judgment" requires federal judges to decide
1
See discussion infra part V.B.
.1-376 U.S. 612 (1964).
1' Id. at 639.
352
Judge (nowJustice) Ruth Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion. Judge Douglas
Ginsburg concurred. To avoid confusion, the text simply refers to the "majority" (or
the "court") and the "concurrence" without mentioning the judges by name.
"5 In reKAI, 829 F.2d at 1174. The court treated this as a question of first impression, although it noted that the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation once assumed, after "only fleeting consideration," that Van Dusen governed multidistrict
consolidations. The court failed to note that several other courts had also ruled on
this issue. See infra note 164.
- Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
"5 In re KAL, 829 F.2d at 1174.
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cases without blindly following the precedents of other jurisdictions. Thus, the D.C. District Court is bound solely by
the case law of the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court; the
only if they
rules of all other jurisdictions will be followed
1 56
are sufficiently persuasive to so warrant.
Similarly, federal law should be regarded as "a single
57
body of law.'
Indeed, because there is ultimately a single proper interpretation of federal law, the attempt to ascertain and apply diverse circuit court interpretations simultaneously is
inherently self-contradictory. Our system contemplates differences between different states' laws; thus a multidistrict
judge asked to apply divergent state positions on a point of
law would face a coherent, if sometimes difficult, task. But
it is logically inconsistent to require one judge to apply simultaneously different and conflicting interpretations of
what is supposed to be a unitary federal law.'
The court also suggested that uniformity and efficiency,
the purposes of multidistrict consolidation,' 59 would be
IN See id. at 1175 (quoting Richard L. Marcus, Conflict Among Circuitsand Transfers
within the FederalJudicialSystem, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 702 (1984) ("There is no room in
the federal system of review for rote acceptance of the decision of a court outside
the chain of direct review."). This argument cannot be disputed; it is inherent in
the judicial hierarchy. Nevertheless, the argument does not seem to resolve the
question before the court. Rather, the hierarchy argument justified Judge Robinson's decision to reconsider the Second Circuit precedents, without determining
whether Van Dusen required that he apply the Second Circuit rules to claims transferred from there.
1-7Id. (quoting H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963)).
- 829 F.2d at 1175-76. Ironically, although the court below also declined to apply tranferor precedent to claims transferred from the Central District of California,
In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. 1478 (D.D.C. 1986), it engaged in the precise sort of "inherently contradictory analysis" condemned by the circuit court. The district court,
expressly applying Van Dusen, noted that the transferor district's "decisions could
not be ignored." Instead, the D.D.C. determined that an examination of the case
law indicated that the Central District of California would not follow those earlier
decisions today. In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1481.
159 The similarities between the purposes of the Multidistrict Litigation Act and
the Warsaw Convention suggest the connection between proper interpretation of
the Convention and the proper management of mass torts. The court could haveshould have-justified its decision on the Warsaw Convention's purposes as well, for
the United States cannot claim to meet its obligation to implement a treaty intended
to promote uniformity if plaintiffs in the same case are treated differently. Thus, the
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thwarted by the application of the Van Dusen rule in this
context.16 ° The concurrence explored this further, arguing
that such an approach would "frustrate" the purpose of the
Multidistrict Litigation Act "'to promote the just and efficient conduct' of multidistrict actions ...by'eliminat[ing]
the potential for conflicting contemporaneous pretrial rulings by coordinate district and appellate courts.' "161 Indeed, both the majority and the concurrence suggested
that such an approach would not only frustrate the advantages of consolidation, but might even make consolidation
more burdensome than separate consideration by "generating rather than reducing the duplication and protraction
Congress sought to check" and having "transferee judges
burdened with the hopelessly162complex task of sitting as several federal judges at once."
In KAL, the D.C. Circuit, in a ruling on a fundamental
question of the structure of the American judicial system
certain to affect all subsequent multidistrict consolidations,
took a narrow view of a major Supreme Court case and preserved the integrity of the Multidistrict Litigation Act. The
court recognized the importance of its decision and twice
invited "Higher Authority"-namely, Congress or the
Supreme Court-to review the decision. 163 Yet, the
Supreme Court did not address the Van Dusen question on
review, perhaps because the circuits had not "split" on the
Van Dusen issue,164 only on the merits of the KAL case itcourt's decision appears to represent the absolute minimum obligation the Convention places on the United States.
1- In re KAL, 829 F.2d at 1175.
161 Id. at 1179 (quoting In re Plumbing Fixtures Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 491-92
(J.P.M.L. 1968)).
162 Id. at 1176, 1184.
163 Id. at 1174, 1176. In fact, the very purpose of the concurrence was to "surface
preliminarily some ameliorative steps open only to Congress." Id. at 1176 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
164 The D.C. Circuit appears to have been the first circuit court to address this
issue, but the earlier decisions of the Judicial Panel on Multidistict Litigation had
uniformly ruled (albeit with little analysis) that Van Dusen applied to Multidistrict
consolidations. See In re Air Crash at Boston, Mass. on July 31, 1993, 399 F. Supp.
1106 (D. Mass. 1975); In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig., 370 F. Supp. 219 (W.D.
Okla. 1974); In re Air Crash Disaster near Hanover, N.H. on Oct. 25, 1968, 314 F.
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self.165 In any event, it appears that Supreme Court review
of this issue may have been unnecessary. The D.C. Circuit
view has been accepted elsewhere,166 including importantly
the Second Circuit, which might have objected to the KAL
interpretation of Van Dusen as a means of defending the
1 67
interests of New York plaintiffs in its own precedents.
Still, a related issue may yet reach the Supreme Court, as
the Second and Seventh Circuits have split over whether
amendments to the 1934 Securities Act168have created a statutory exception to KAL's general rule.
V. JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
WARSAW CONVENTION
Plaintiffs, naturally enough, have consistently sought to
escape the damage limitations imposed by the Warsaw Convention. Plaintiffs' arguments can be classified in three categories: challenges to the validity of the Convention;
exceptions to the damage cap within the Convention itself;
and the existence of remedies beyond (and notwithstanding) the Convention.
It is, of course, the institutional task of the plaintiffs' bar
(not to mention the source of much additional income to
the attorneys involved) to argue zealously that the facts of
their client's cases warrant unlimited damages. It is the inSupp. 62 (J.P.M.L. 1970); In re Plumbing Fixtures Litig., 342 F. Supp. 756, 758
(J.P.M.L. 1972).

- See discussion infra part V.B.
IN See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Detroit Metro Airport, 791 F. Supp. 1204, 1212-13
(E.D. Mich. 1992); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 548
(D.NJ. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994).
16' Coker v. Pan Am. World Airways, 950 F.2d 839, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1991).
IN Compare Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding transferee court is not bound by law of transferor court despite Section 27A of the 1934

Act) with Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 883 (1994) (holding Section 27A mandates that transferee courts

must apply law of transferor court, creating an exception to the ordinary rule of
KAL). While the Seventh Circuit purported to agree with KAL, its reasoning suggests a broad challenge to KAL, particularly by disputing whether Van Dusen is limited to cases governed by state law. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
Indeed, based on Eckstein's reasoning, Judge Hogan of the D.D.C. construed narrowly the D.C. Circuit's decision in KAL In re United Mine Workers of Am. Employee Benefits Plan Litig., 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7491 (D.D.C. 1994).
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stitutional task ofjudges to identify and police plaintiffs' excesses. In some cases, however, American judges have
assisted plaintiffs in evading Article 22-even when this required forcing a square peg into a round hole, or drilling a
new hole in the Convention.
Various cases have questioned the Convention's validity,
expanded its loopholes, and found other domestic remedies available. Thus, courts have encouraged plaintiffs' (or,
at least the plaintiff bar's) natural tendency to litigate in
search of new, wider paths to unlimited damages. As a result, the ability of the Convention to facilitate rapid settlements has been severely constrained.
The Convention gives short shrift to Weinstein equity #1
by fixing the damage cap inequitably low, so American
judges understandably are tempted to use their equitable
powers to circumvent the damage cap.169 Nevertheless,
judges must not let this temptation lead to decisions inconsistent with sound interpretation of the Convention. Such
excesses attack the Convention and defeat its purposes, including dispute settlement, by unnecessarily encouraging
and complicating litigation.
While such excesses in the name of equity should be
roundly criticized as 'Judicial treaty-making,"1 70 i.e. rewriting the treaty to suit the judge's preferences, not all decisions favoring plaintiffs was lent this condemnation. Those
cases exhibiting a sound approach to treaty interpretation
(i.e., an approach consistent with the Vienna Convention)
should be applauded, even where a plaintiff's judgment
will predictably spur future litigation. Such decisions do
not attack the Warsaw Convention, but show the Warsaw
Convention's limitations as a mechanism for resolving mass
tort litigation.
69 See generaly, Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 122, at 272, 327, (citing such
judicial attitudes as "equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy" and
"equity isthe perfection of the law").
170 The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71-73 (1821) (Story, J.), quoted in
Trans World Airways v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 263-64 (1984) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). See also Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508, 514
(2d Cir. 1966) (Moore, J.,dissenting), aff'd, 390 U.S. 455 (1967).

494
A.
1.

JOURNAL OFAIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[60

CHALLENGES TO THE VALIDITY OF THE CONVENTION

ConstitutionalChallenges

The Constitution establishes the status of treaties in U.S.
law. Once the President, with the consent of two-thirds of
the Senate, "makes" a treaty,' 7' it becomes "the supreme law
of the land." 72 In short, treaties are subordinate to the
Constitution; 17 3 have equal rank with federal statutes, with
the later in time prevailing in a conflict; 174 and "preempt"
conflicting state law.175 Being subordinate to the Constitution, treaties are subject to the same constitutional attacks
as are statutes. 76 The Warsaw Convention, accordingly, has
faced-and survived-challenges based on substantive due
process, 77 equal protection,1 78 the right to travel, 79 failure
1' U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl.2.
172 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. As the courts have interpreted this article, a treaty.
becomes "the supreme law of the land" only if it "self-executes." See infra notes 17880 and accompanying text.
173See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1957) (ending earlier doubts about this
proposition stemming from the structure of Article VI and dicta by Justice Holmes
in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)). See HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
supra note 61, at 137-140.
174Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (later statute prevails); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1871) (same); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,
194 (1888) (same); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118 (1933) (later treaty
prevails). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 67, § 115; HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 61, at'163-64.
175Howenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488-90 (1879); Asakura v. City of Seattle,
265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); see also HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 61, at 129 &
n.3, 165-67; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 67, § 115, cmt. e, rptr. n.5.
176 There is one exception to this rule: all treaties, regardless of subject matter,
fall within the enumerated powers of the federal government. Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416, 432-34 (1920) (Holmes, J.) (holding that the United States could
enter a treaty with Britain 'on bird migration from Canada, and implement it by
federal legislation, even though Congress could not otherwise enact a statute on that
subject). Nevertheless, this distinction-significant as it was in 1920-is meaningless today, as no statute has been overturned on these grounds since the rise of
modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the 1930s. Compare A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (reading Congressional power to
legislate under the Commerce Clause restrictively) with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (reading Congressional power to legislate under the
Commerce Clause expansively). See generally HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note
61, at 142-48 (1972).
- In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
178 Id. at 1312. Strictly speaking, since plaintiffs challenged an act of the federal
government, not a state, the suit hinged on the equal Protection component of Fifth
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to follow constitutionally mandated procedures,1 80 the takings clause,'8 " the infringement of Congress's power to regulate commerce by the President and Senate through the
treaty-making power,1a 2 the right to a jury trial,' 83 and the
right of access to federal courts. 184 An Illinois state court
purported, in dicta, to declare the Convention unconstitutional, but that decision was subsequently withdrawn and

has not been followed elsewhere.' 5
Under the "last in time" rule, subsequent legislation
passed by Congress incapable of reconciliation with the
Convention would impliedly repeal the Convention for domestic purposes to the extent mandated by a fair interpretation of the legislation.' 8 6 But, "where fairly possible," a
statute should be "construed so as not to conflict with...
an international agreement of the United States.' 87 Accordingly, in holding that Congress did not impliedly abrogate the Convention by repealing the Par Value
Modification Act in 1978, the Supreme Court stated that
Amendment due process, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
17 684 F.2d at 1310.
180 Id. at 1307 n.5. Plaintiffs argued that the Senate never consented to the Convention, presumably based on the fact that the Senate acted "without debate, committee hearing, or report... by voice vote." Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note
25, at 502. The court cited the Congressional Record notice of consent and observed that the Senate had many years to correct any misunderstandings in this
regard.
181 Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan Am. Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y.
1944).
182 Id. at 340.
183 Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, 152 F. Supp. 486, 489 (D.N.J. 1957).
184 McCarthy v. East African Airways, 13 Avi. 17,385, 17,386 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd
sub nom. Fay v. East African Airways, 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1974).
- Burdell v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 10 Avi. 18,151 (Il1.Cir. Ct. 1968) (holding
Convention inapplicable to flight to Singapore, a non-signatory; then addressing
constitutionality of Convention in dicta), withdrawn 11 Avi. 17,351, 17,354 (1961)
(stating that although the court finds "plaintiff's contentions to be persuasive," in
light of the finding that the case did not concern "international transportation," as
defined in Article 1 of the Convention, "the Court feels constrained to forego ruling
on any arguments regarding the Convention's constitutionality").
-8 RFSTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 67, § 115.
187 Id. § 114. Cf Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804) (Marshall, C.J.) (stating "an Act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains").
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"[t] here a firm and obviously sound canon of construction
against finding implicit repeal of a treaty in ambiguous congressional action." 188
Chief Justice Marshall found that the supremacy clause
determined another aspect of treaties' status: Treaties are
"to be regarded in courts ofjustice as equivalent to an act of
the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid
of any legislative provision."189 Nevertheless, if "the parties
engage[ ] to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses
itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the
legislature must execute the contract before it can become
a rule for the Court."190 U.S. law thus distinguishes between
"self-executing" and "non-self-executing" treaties.19' The
held that the Warsaw ConvenSupreme Court has expressly
92
tion is self-executing.
By their nature, all treaties create international obligations between the signatory states. American courts recognize that some self-executing treaties also create privately
enforceable rights. 93 Cases "arising under" a self-executing
treaty may be brought in federal court and may be removed
- Franklin Min4 466 U.S. at 251-53. Cf REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 67,
§ 115, cmL a.
- Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
1 Id. For example, the United States cannot spend money pursuant to a treaty,
unless Congress appropriates the funds by statute. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; see HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 61, at 159 & n.98.
19, See generally HENKIN, FoREIGN AF'AInts, supra note 61, at 156-62. The Supreme
Court has recognized the Senate's power to place conditions on its consent. Haver
v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32, 35 (1869). In particular, the Senate may require, as a

condition of its consent, that a treaty be regarded as non-self-executing. United
States v. American Sugar Co., 202 U.S. 563 (1906). See, e.g., S. Exec. Rep. No. 2.,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1985) (declaring the Genocide Convention a non-self-executing treaty), reprinted in Marian N. Leich, Contempormy Practice of the United States
Relating to InternationalLaw, 80 AM.J. IN'L L. 612, 621 (1986). If the Senate is silent,
courts give "great weight" to the President's view in determining whether a treaty is
self-executing. Courts will also consider whether the treaty creates judicially manageable standards. See Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 620-622 (Cal. 1952) (holding
U.N. Charter is not self-executing).
I" Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at 252, 276 n.5.
See also RESTATEMENT
"9 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
(THIRD), supra note 67, § 907(1); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and
Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082 (1992).
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there from state court.19 4 The Warsaw Convention creates
both a civil cause of action' 95 and a defense. 96 Thus, if an
injured passenger sued an airline for compensatory and punitive damages in a case subject to the Convention, the
Court should grant the defendant's motion for9 partial summary judgment against the punitive damages. 7
Based on the unique history of the Warsaw Convention,
plaintiffs could argue that the Convention expired in 1966,
because President Johnson lacked the power to withdraw
his denunciation during the six months before it took effect. 98 There is no constitutional basis, however, for such a
limitation on Presidential control over foreign policy.
Moreover, the courts would likely find that such a claim
sought unwarranted judicial interference in foreign policy
and thus presented a nonjusticiable "political question." 99
2. InternationalLaw Challenges
As Professor Henkin has noted, "[t] he status of a treaty as
law of the land derives from and depends on its status as a
valid, living treaty of the United States." 2°° Therefore, treaties may be challenged not only on domestic legal grounds,
but also under international law.2 '
,9 U.S. CONST. art. III; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441. Cf Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 DalI.
419, 474 (U.S. 1793) (Op. of Jay, C.J.).
195Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
- Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
197 See discussion infra part V.B.
- See discussion supra part II. Conversely, others have argued that the President
lacked the power to denounce the Convention without Senate consent. See, e.g.,
PresidentialAmendment and Termination of Treaties: The Case of the Warsaw Convention,
34 U. CHI. L. REv. 580 (1967).
19 Cf Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (finding nonjusticiable a Senator's claim that the President could not terminate a defense treaty with Taiwan unless two-thirds of the Senate consented). Justice Brennan, dissenting, ruled for the
President on the merits, as did the Court of Appeals. Id. at 1006; 617 F.2d 697, 70507 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 67, § 339;
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFARnS, supra note 61, at 136, 168-70; SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMrrrEE, TERMINATION OF TREATIES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OF POWER

(1978) (compiling materials).
200 HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRs, supra note 61, at 160.

NJ1See Vienna Convention, supra note 66, arts. 42-68 (identifying grounds for the
invalidation or termination of treaties).
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Some claims raise both issues: for the Convention to remain U.S. law today, President Johnson must have had the
power to withdraw his denunciation under both constitutional and international law. Indeed, at the time of the denunciation, the United States and other signatories
considered and rejected-the view that international law
precluded such withdrawals. 20 2 No state-party has ever

claimed that its Convention obligations to the United States
terminated in 1966. Just three years later, in the Vienna
Convention, the international community codified
this
20 3
state practice as a rule permitting such withdrawals.
In another aviation case, the plaintiff argued that the
United States' abandonment of the gold standard, on
which the Warsaw Convention bases its damage cap,20 4 constituted a "fundamental change of circumstances" invalidating the Convention and barring future enforcement of the
cap. The Supreme Court properly recognized that international law allows a state-party to a treaty to invoke the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus under certain circumstances to
excuse its non-performance of its treaty obligations.0 5 The
Court then rejected plaintiff's misreading of this doctrine:
"But when the parties to a treaty continue to assert its vitality a private person who finds the continued existence of
the treaty inconvenient may not invoke the doctrine on
their behalf."206

With this eminently sensible conclusion-reached, regrettably, without reference to the Vienna Conventionthe Court affirmed a basic principle of U.S. foreign relations law: the Executive (with the consent of the Senate)
makes treaties that remain positive law, binding on private
persons, the government, and the Judiciary, unless repudiated by the Executive or the Legislature.
- Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 550 & n.177.
Vienna Convention, supra note 66, art. 68.
- Warsaw Convention, supra note 13, art. 22.
SSee Vienna Convention, supra note 66, art. 62.
200 Franklin Min4 466 U.S. at 253; cf. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 473-76
(1913) (holding a "voidable" treaty remains binding law unless "voided" by the Executive branch).
"'s
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3. Equitable Challenges
The Judiciary has sometimes forgotten this basic principle of treaty law, apparently regardingtreaties as an illegitimate half-sibling of statutes, not really the supreme law of
the land. Recognizing that the Convention shortshrifts passengers' interests by setting the damage cap too low, some
judges apparently believe their equitable powers allow them
to set 7the Convention aside to avoid its unfairly lowdamage
20
cap.
The argument typically proceeds as follows: the Convention set the damage cap low in 1929 to protect a "fledgling
industry,"20 8 but the industry has subsequently matured and

is now capable of paying higher damage awards. Further,
the risks of aviation in 1929 were both very high and poorly
understood, making insurance commercially infeasible
without a strict damage cap, but aviation is much safer now
and the risks are well known. Therefore, the damage cap is
no longer necessary (or less so) and should not be (strictly)
enforced.2° Some judges have added, apparently deeming
it legally relevant, that the United States has advocated a
higher damage cap2 10 and that various Members of Con2 11
gress have criticized the cap.
These arguments are sound on their facts, but fatally
flawed in their logic. It is true that the aviation industry has
matured, safety has improved, the risks are well understood,
See discussion supra part W.A.
- For a vivid description of the aviation industry in 1929, see Lee Kriendler, I Av.
Accident L. 342 (1963), quoted in, Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines,
Ltd. 219 F. Supp. 289, 322-23 n.18 (1963).- See, e.g., Reed v. Wiser, 414 F. Supp. 863, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd 555 F.2d
1079, 1092 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); In reAir Crash in Bali, Indon.,
462 F. Supp. 1114, 1124-26 (C.D. Ca. 1978), rev'd, 684 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir.
1982).
210 In reAir Crash in Bali, Indon., 462 F. Supp 1114, 1124 (C.D. Ca. 1978), rev'd,
684 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982). In an equally impermissible variant of this
argument, the Fifth Circuit justified a decision to allow certain damages above the
cap as being consistent with the purposes of the Montreal Agreement to "allow victims a
more adequate recovery," as if this somehow modified the Convention's purpose of
certainty. Domangue v. Eastern Air Lines, 722 F.2d 256, 261-63 (5th Cir. 1984).
21, Reed v. Wiser, 414 F. Supp. 863, (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
-7
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the United States has advocated raising the damage cap,
and Members of Congress have criticized the cap. But all of
these facts are completely irrelevant to the judicial function
in deciding aviation cases. The Warsaw Convention is positive law, the supreme law of the land.21 2
Since Lyndon Johnson withdrew his denunciation of the
Convention in 1966, six successive Presidents have declined
to exercise their power to denounce the Convention again.
Congress has never passed legislation to prevent the Convention's domestic enforcement. Therefore, whatever a
judge might think about the policies underlying the United
States continued adherence to the Convention, it remains
the law and the judge must enforce it. 215 The constitutional
principle of separation of powers simply does not permit
the Judiciary to second-guess the policy determinations of
the political branches. 4
Justice Stevens expressed this point unequivocally:
[T]hough application of the Warsaw Convention's liability
limitation is anachronistic in today's world of aviation, we
are obliged to enforce it so long as the political branches of
the Government adhere to the Convention. The maxim
that cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex, applicable to the
common law, does not govern the judiciary in cases involving application of positive law.21 5
212 As the Second Circuit stated when reversing a district court opinion that endorsed the fledgling industry argument, "These arguments misconceive our function. We do not sit to decide whether laws are no longer necessary or to assess the
diplomatic consequences of their abandonment . . . . [U]ntil one of our sister
branches declares otherwise, the Warsaw Convention remains the Supreme law of
the land." Reed, 555 F.2d at 1073.
213 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 399 (quoting Reed, 555 F.2d 1079); Foyd, 499 U.S. at 546
(stating "Whatever may be the current view among Convention signatories, in 1929
the parties were more concerned with protecting air carriers and fostering a new
industry than providing full recovery to injured passengers, and we read 'lsion
corporelli in a way that respects that legislative choice.").
214 Compare In reAir Crash in Bali, 462 F. Supp. at 1125 (questioning the "wisdom"
of continued adherence to the Convention) with In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1474-75
(recognizing obligation to enforce damage cap, despite personally finding it
"disturbing").
215 Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 273 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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EXCEPTIONS TO THE DAMAGE CAP UNDER THE
CONVENTION

The Warsaw Convention includes two relevant exceptions
to Article 22's damage cap: doP 16 and failure to deliver a

21 7
passenger ticket.

1. Dol
Much air disaster litigation surrounds Article 25(1),
which reads:

The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability if
the damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such
default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the
Court to which the case is submitted,
is considered to be
218
equivalent to willful misconduct.
This article openly invites plaintiffs to litigate.2 19 When is
an act or omission willful? Just what behavior is the
equivalent or willful misconduct? Is the test subjective or
objective? Must the damage have been foreseeable? How
proximate must the cause be? Must the act or omission be
a single (major?) event which "caused" the damage, or can
a series of small decisions trigger Article 25? And what legal
consequences result from a finding of willful misconduct?
American courts have grappled with all these questions.
Underlying all analysis of Article 25 should be the French
concept of do4,because the French text of the Convention is
binding U.S. law. 220 An element of dol is the intent to cause
harm. 22 1 "Willful misconduct," the term used in the unofficial English translation of Article 25, imperfectly captures
the essence of do/, because-although willfulness would
216 Warsaw
'
218

Convention, supra note 13, art. 25.
Id. art. 3.

Id. art. 25(1).

Article 25 has long been subject to ,criticism. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 25, at 503.
. See discussion supra part III.C.
221 Gallais v. Afro Maritime, Ltd., 1954 R.F.D.A. 184 (T.G.I. Seine 1954), discussed
in 22J. AIR L. & COM. 99 (1955).
29
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seem to require intent-as a term of art it does not in fact
do so. Instead, courts have generally regarded "willful misconduct" as equivalent to recklessness or gross
negligence. 22
As a result, many American judges have found "willful
misconduct"2 23 and accordingly waived the damage cap 2in
24
circumstances far beyond the French concept of dol
One case found willful misconduct where a plane crashed
into a mountain while violating a safety regulation setting
the minimum altitude.225 Another case found willful misconduct where the crew failed to radio mayday when crashing into a river and then was unable to maneuver a lifeboat
to save a passenger on the plane's tail. 2 26 A third case

found willful misconduct where an airplane crashed while
attempting to land in poor visibility even though the crew
knew the risks of doing so. 22 7 KAL lost a motion for sum-

mary judgment against plaintiffs' claim of willful misconduct, where plaintiffs argued that the pilot violated
ordinary procedures by attempting to navigate without an
"inertia navigation system," which he knew to be broken,
- W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 212-14 (5th ed. 1984). In
criminal law, by contrast, "willfully" is a stricter standard of mental culpability than
.recklessly" or "negligently." See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) (defining the four standards of mental culpability: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, negligently); § 2.02(8) (identifying willfully as equivalent to knowingly, "unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears in the text").
23 Of course, juries generally make the finding of willful misconduct. This point
addresses the legal definition of willful misconduct, as it impacts the judgment
through motions for summary judgment, jury instructions, motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and appeals.
24 Many courts have expressly defined "willful misconduct" to include "reckless
disregard." See, e.g., American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
One judge even instructed the jury to find willful misconduct if the pilot was "careless" and, when the jury nevertheless found for the carrier, granted plaintiff a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines,
219 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 346 F.2d 532, 536-38 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
2- American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 921 (1961). The court also upheld a willful misconduct verdict as reasonable
based on the airline's minimal safety instructions even though these complied with
relevant Irish law. Id. at 779.
-7 Butler v. Aeromexico, 19 Avi. 17,961 (11th Cir. 1985).
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thereby causing the plane to fly off-course where Soviet
fighters destroyed it. 2
In transforming dol to gross negligence, American courts
have avoided the difficult task of determining whether a defendant airline subjectively intended to cause harm. Recognizing these difficulties, the international community
proposed amending Article 25 to include reckless acts and
omissions. 29 Even France has defined dol by statute to include "inexcusable negligence." 23 0 The United States, however, has neither ratified the Hague Protocol nor enacted
relevant legislation, so American courts remain bound by
the original Article 25, including the traditional French definition of dol.
The American case law may nevertheless be justified by
the "curious," "unhappy"231 wording of Article 25: the damage cap is waived in cases of dol or such misconduct as is
considered "in accordance with the law of the court to
which the case is submitted" to be "equivalent" to dol.
While "willful misconduct," which includes recklessness, is
an inappropriate translation of dol it may be regarded as the
common law's equivalent of dol. The travaux preparatories
support this view.
If this interpretation is proper it is nev2-0 In re KAL, 704 F. Supp. 1135 (D.D.C. 1988).
If proven, other allegations
against KAL would clearly support a finding of doL. After destroying Flight #007, the
Soviets accused KAL of deliberately violating Soviet airspace to spy. The Soviets also
claimed that the pilots ignored radio contacts and warning shots. With the end of
the Cold War, however, Boris Yeltsin released documents-including the transcript
of Flight #007's black box-which show that the pilots were unaware of their predicament before the fatal strike, thereby undermining the Soviet claims. Michael
Dobbs, KAL 007 Fell Amid Chaos, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1992, at Al. Indeed a lawyer
for the KAL plaintiffs has conceded that the black box has "probably ended any
contention th[at] Flight 7 was on a spy mission." Pounian, supra note 10, at 3.
Hague Protocol, supra note 57, art. 13.
2-0 Civil Aviation Code 321-4, discussed in Delgado v. Pan Am. World Airways, 16
Avi. 18,462, 18,466 (P.R. 1982).
23,Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 219 F. Supp. 289, 322 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), rev'd on other grounds, 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983
(1966).
232 The meaning of Article 25 appears to be sufficiently "ambiguous or obscure"
to warrant resort to the travaux preparatories,especially given the lack of a suitable
common law term to use in translation. See discussion supra part III.B. The
.equivalent of" clause seems to have been added in response to the remarks of the
British delegate (two Americans were present, but only as observers" that "We have
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ertheless unfortunate, because it reads narrowly an exception intended to be a "very restrictive concept,"2 33 thereby

seriously undermining the Convention's purpose of certainty. By allowing the courts of each signatory to determine whether Article 25 hinges on intentional wrongdoing
or mere recklessness negligence, this interpretation also
threatens the purpose of uniformity.
Once dol has been found, there remains the question
whether the Convention continues to limit judicial discretion to grant damages otherwise available in domestic law.
For example, may a court award punitive damages in cases
of willful misconduct? After a former security officer accused Pan Am of "play[ing] Russian roulette" with passengers' lives through its lax security, a federal jury found that
such laxness constituted willful misconduct responsible for
the Lockerbie bombing. 34 The Lockerbie court held that
with us the expression 'willful misconduct.' I believe it covers all that you want to
say; it covers not only acts committed deliberately, but also acts d'insouciancesans
egard aux consequences" i.e., acts of carelessness done without regard for the conse-

quences. Id. at 321. thus, the travauxpreparatoriessuggest that dot and the equivalent
thereof should be translated together as "willful misconduct." The official English

translation errs by directly equating dol with "willful misconduct," which renders the
equivalent of" clause completely meaningless. See id.
-" Delgado v. Pan Am. World Airways, 16 Avi. 18,462, 18,466 (P.R. 1982) (quoting

Georges Ripert, the French delegate at Warsaw).
24 Laurie Goodstein, Pan Am was Lax in Security, Bor
Trial Witnesses Charge,
WASH. PosT, June 1992, at A2; Pan Am Ruled Liable in Right 103 Bombing, WASH. POST,

July 11, 1992, at A3. The Second Circuit upheld the verdict. Pagnucco v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 1994 WL 498454 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 1994).
In light of the lengthy lawsuits and massive damage awards for KAL and Lockerbie, the two major air disasters of the 1980s, it is interesting to consider that the
United States apparently once contemplated amending the Convention by protocol
to eliminate airline liability "if it proves that the accident which caused the damage
was the result of a wil[I]ful act by a third party intended to, and having the effect of,
destroying the aircraft." Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 570-70 & n.252.
Had this provision become law, both Pan Am and KAL would have avoided all liability for these tragedies even though juries determined that the airlines' misconduct
allowed the third party to act. Apparently, even a foreseeable consequence of a
foreseeable intervening act would have completely eclipsed the carrier's own liability, contravening ordinary principles of tort law and further skewing the imbalance
between Weinstein equities #2 and #3. See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS 305 (5th ed. 1984). For a list of airplane sabotage incidents from 1949-89,
see PRESIDENT'S

at 60-66.

COMM'N ON AVIATION

SECURITY & TERRORISM, REPORT, supra note

21,
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the Convention always prohibits punitive damages.2 3 - The
court demonstrated a sophisticated approach to treaty interpretation by relying on the French text, looking to the
implementation in several other countries, and striving to
fulfill the Convention's purposes. In short, it concluded
that punitive damages were beyond the scope of the French
text of Article 17 as it would be understood by a French civil
lawyer. Thus, even though Article 25 waives Article 22's
damage cap, it is Article 17 which establishes the injuries
for which the carrier is liable: namely, dommage survenu or
damages sustained, i.e., compensatory damages only.2 36 Article 25 simply does not affect the scope of Article 17, only
Article 22's monetary cap. 237
The Lockerbie court declined to follow the one case, KAL,
where a U.S. court allowed punitive damages, stating that
"the presiding judge affirmed the jury award . .. without
opinion. "23 The D.C. Circuit, agreeing with Lockerbie, subsequently overturned the $50 million punitive damage
award.239 KAL noted that the Convention should be interpreted to exclude punitive damages because they "would be
controversial for most signatory countries," and the purpose of uniformity requires a construction which avoids a
"potential source of divergence."24 °
In Floyd, the Supreme Court held that a passenger in a
plane which narrowly avoided crashing could not collect
damages for emotional distress unconnected to any lesion
2- In reAir disaster at Lockerbie, Scot. on December 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 331 (1991).
',

Id. at 1280-81.

237 Id.

at 1285.

Id. at 1277.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 616 (1991). The
2-39In re KAL, 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
KAL opinion paralleled Lockerbie showing concern for: the purposes of uniformity
2M

and efficiency; the "shared expectations of the contracting parties"; the French text,
understood "in accordance with [its] French legal meaning"; and foreign interpretations of Article 17 and attitudes towards punitive damages generally. Id. at 1485-90.
240 Id. at 1487 (quoting Foyd,499 U.S. at 552). The Lockerbie and KAL decisions
have been criticized in Kelly Compton Grems, Punitive Damages under the Warsaw

Convention, 41 Am. U. L. REv. 141 (1991), but the criticisms, based as they are on
domestic law, give insufficient weight to international principles of treaty interpreta-

tion and the Convention's purposes of uniformity and certainty.
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corporelle (i.e., bodily injury).2 4

The Court expressly de-

clined to address whether damages are available for emotional harm connected to bodily injury,242 an issue which

becomes important in cases of doL Judge Weinstein recently addressed this issue, taking a narrow, though defensible, view of both Floyd and In re Lockerbie.2 43 After a jury
found that TWA's lax security constituted willful misconduct and that a passenger suffered pain and suffering as he
fell to his death from the airplane after a bomb exploded,
Judge Weinstein held that his heirs could collect unlimited
pain and suffering damages once Article 25 waived Article
22.244 This approach is consistent with In re Lockerbie in that
emotional damages for pain and suffering are compensatory in nature, so long as one does not read Article 17 so

narrowly as to apply to compensation only for physical damages sustained. The same analysis would permit collection

of damages for loss of parental and spousal companionship
and support. 45

241 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 530. For an unusual case following fToyd, see Yin Yee Li v.
Quaraishi, 780 F. Supp. 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
242 Royd, 499 U.S. at 551.
243 In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc. Aircraft Approaching
Athens, Greece on Apr. 2, 1986, 778 F. Supp. 625 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (Weinstein, J.),
rev'd on other grounds sub non Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.
1992) (reversing judgment of dol without addressing availability of pain and suffering damages), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1944 (1993). Judge Weinstein took a sophisticated approach to treaty interpretation, relying on the French text and examining
Israeli precedent. Id. at 638-40. But he appears to give insufficient weight to the
purpose of uniformity. Id at 639-40. And, in narrowing In re Lockerbie he seems
motivated by an impermissible concern to protect plaintiffs from damage cap
designed to protect a "fledgling industry," which "is not still 'fledgling.'" Id. at 641.
See discussion supra part V.A.
2144
CompareJack v. Trans World Airlines, 854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding "[o]nly emotional distress flowing from the bodily injury is recoverable") with
Pounian, supra note 10, at 3 (discussing cases which award survivors as much as one
million dollars for the pre-impact fear of deceased KAL passengers).
245 See, e.g., Pagnucco v. Pan Am. World Airways, 1994 WL 498454, at *25 (2d Cir.
Sept. 12, 1994) (holding that general principles of maritime law applicable to interpreting the Warsaw Convention permit recovery for loss of society by spouses and
dependents and for loss of support by spouses, minor children and adult children
who suffer financially). This decision, reached on reconsideration of the Lockerbie
case, will impact the ongoing KAL litigation. See Pounian, supra note 10, at 3 n.5;
Korean Air Lines 007 Disaster Litigation - Damage Awards Rendered in Ten Passenger
Cases, 12 LLoYD's AvIATION LAw 1 (July 15, 1993).
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2. Adequate Delivery
Under Article 3, if an airline fails to deliver a ticket to the
passengers, they are not bound by the damage cap.246 This
could happen, for example, in the case of individual passengers on a chartered flight. Plaintiffs have repeatedly
claimed that Article 3 goes further: beyond requiring mere
delivery of a ticket, Article 3 requires the airline to deliver
an adequate ticket adequately. Under this interpretation,
Article 3 punishes inadequacies with the Convention's ultimate sanction: unlimited liability. A line of cases beginning in 1965, at the height of American frustration with the
Warsaw Convention in the period preceding the Montreal
Agreement, 247 accepted this view.
After the Second Circuit held that military personnel
who were delivered their tickets after boarding the plane
were not subject to the damage cap, 248 the Ninth Circuit
extended the ruling to soldiers who received their tickets
immediately before boarding.2 49 These cases held that the
airline delivered the ticket inadequately (i.e. too late) and
therefore waived the benefit of the damage cap. The courts
reasoned that the purpose of Article 3(1) (e) was to afford
passengers notice of the damage cap so that they could take
measures to protect themselves from the risk of uncompensated damages. They could purchase travel insurance, neArticle 3(1) of the Warsaw Convention provides:
For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:... (e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability
established by this convention.
Article 3(2) reads:
The absence, irregularity or loss of the passenger ticket shall not affect
the existence or the validity of the contract of transportation, which
shall none the less be subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket
having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself of those
provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 13, art. 3.
247 See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25.
248 Mertens v. Flying Tiger Lines, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
816 (1965).
249 Warren v. Flying Tiger Lines, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
246
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gotiate a higher damage cap with the airline, 5 ° choose to
fly on a different airline, 25t or even decide not to fly altogether. The courts then interpreted Article 3 in light of
this object and purpose, by requiring that airlines provide
the notice sufficiently before the flight to allow passengers
to take protective measures.252
The next year, the Second Circuit held in Lisi that the
damage limitation did not apply when the airline printed
the statement required by Article 3(1) (e) in type so small as
to be illegible. 253 Airlines could only satisfy the purpose of
notice when the statement that "the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability established by this convention" was printed legibly.25 4 Lisi thus expanded the
requirement from adequate
delivery of a ticket to delivery
255
of an adequate ticket.
-0 Article 22(1) expressly allows such "special contracts." Warsaw Convention,
supra note 13, art. 22(1).
251 A passenger could choose to fly on a safer airline, or on an airline, like All
Nippon Airways, which voluntarily agrees to pay damages above the cap. See DOT
Approves Waiver by ANA of Warsaw Convention/MontrealAgreement Limits of Liability, 12
LLoYD's AVtATION LAw 1 (Feb. 1, 1993)
252 Warren declared this to be an "implied requirement" of Article 3(2). Warren,
352 F.2d at 498 (1965).
23 Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508, 514 (2d Cir. 1966),
aff'd without opinion by an evenly divided court 390 U.S. 455 (1968). The tickets at
issue were printed in 4.5 point type, which the court described as "camouflaged in
Lilliputian print in a thicket of 'conditions of contract'.... Indeed, [they] are virtually invisible. They are ineffectively positioned, diminutively sized, and
unemphasized by bold face type, contrasting color, or anything else. The simple
truth is that.., their presence is concealed." See also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 25, at 512-14.
2 Lisi, 370 F.2d at 511.
25 Of course, it does not necessarily follow that the remedy for delivery of a ticket
with an inadequately small statement is unlimited liability. The court seemed to find
such a remedy particularly appropriate where the required statement was a declaration of limited liability. The court declared a "quid pro quo": to qualify for the
damage cap, the airline had to notify the passenger. Citing the "ratio decidendi" of
Mertens, Lisi found unlimited liability an appropriate remedy because the inadequate
notice deprived passengers of the opportunity for self-protection from the possible
harms of the damage cap. Lis4 370 F.2d at 513.
Thus, the court distinguished a contrary precedent which refused to waive the
damage cap for a violation of Article 3(1)(c), which requires that the passenger
ticket state all "agreed stopping places," subject to changes due to emergency. The
flight from New York to Mexico City crashed while landing in Dallas, a stop not
listed on the passenger ticket. Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir.
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Lisi furthered the object and purpose of notice by creating strong incentives for compliance with Article 3(1) (e),
and furthered uniformity in documentation, by ensuring
that all passenger tickets would be legible. 56 One could argue, however, that, in pursuit of uniformity, Lisi sacrificed
certainty. After all, Lisi allowed any court (or, even more
unpredictably, any jury) to determine whether a given
ticket provided minimally adequate notice. The consequences of such a determination were enormous: the difference between $8,300 and unlimited liability. Thus,
where the Convention sought to guarantee the predictability needed for airlines to obtain liability insurance at reasonable rates, under Lisi, there would be uncertainty. This
uncertainty would result in higher premiums and higher
ticket prices, perhaps high enough to threaten the industry.
Where the Convention sought to facilitate rapid settlements, there would be much litigation.
Yet, it proved possible to implement Lisi's minimal adequacy requirement without destroying the Convention.
Clear guidance as to what constituted a minimally adequate
ticket was needed.25 7 The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)

provided the necessary guidance, fixing a minimum of ten
point type.2 5 s And in the Montreal Agreement, all interna1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956). Lisi distinguished Grey on the grounds that
the missing information did not affect the passengers' ability to take self-protective
measures and so did not affect the Warsaw "quid pro quo." Lisi 370 F.2d at 513. See
also Republic Nat'l Bank v. Eastern Airlines, 639 F. Supp. 1410 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd,
815 F.2d 232 (2d. Cir. 1987). While this distinction is reasonable, and may be justified as fulfilling the Convention's "object and purpose," it must be noted that it lacks
a textual basis. See discussion infra note 249.
256 Lisi did not impose a strict rule that would result in identical airline tickets, but
by imposing a requirement of adequacy akin to the common law notion of reasonableness, it ensured that all tickets would be uniform in so far as they would all contain the Article 3(1)(e) information in type which is reasonably (i.e. at least
minimally) legible.
257 Lisi itself did not provide such guidance, but then it would have been inappropriate dictum for the court to set a minimum type size. It was entirely appropriate
for a common law court to hold that 4.5 point type is too small without deciding
whether 6 or 8 point type would be adequate. The common law system required the
Lisi court to leave such hypothetical situations for future cases to decide.
14 C.F.R. § 221.175 (1994).
2-
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tional airlines operating in the United States accepted this
ten point standard. 59
These developments pushed airlines to eliminate "Lisitype" tickets, which had been common at the time.2 6 0 Even

so, however, occasional cases arise involving tickets with
smaller print. Armed with the CAB and Montreal rules,
courts strictly enforced the ten point requirement. A
"bright line" rule thus replaced Lisi's minimal adequacy
test.2 6 1 This "bright line" rule furthered the purposes of no-

tice, uniformity (i.e. all tickets must be written in at least ten
point type) and certainty (i.e. all carriers who violate the
rule will be sanctioned with unlimited liability).262 The

leading case, In re Warsaw, expressly noted that a strict rule
was preferable to the unpredictability of the minimal adequacy approach. 3
The Mertens-Lisi-In re Warsaw line was undoubtedly the
dominant U.S. interpretation of the Warsaw Convention
when Korean Airlines Flight #007 crashed in 1983. But the
ensuing litigation over KAL's use of tickets printed in eight
259 Montreal Agreement, supra note 51, at 552.
20 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 15, at 755-56. For a discussion of the Canadian

cases on "Lisi-type" tickets, see id. at 757-59.
26! In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Pol. on Mar. 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85, 86-87
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983) (holding "the difference between 8.5 and
10-point type, we are told by LOT [Polish Airlines], is 15/270ths of an inch, based on
72 type points to the inch. However minimal a 1.5 point difference in type size
might seem, we conclude that it is enough to ... [hold] that the [plaintiffs] in this
case are not subject to the liability limitation established by the Montreal Agreement") [hereinafter "In reWarsaw"]. See also Trivelloni-Lorenzi v. Pan Am. Airways,
789 F.2d 1092, reh'g granted, 795 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1986), on reh'g, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th
Cir. 1987) (Waiving damage cap for tickets printed in 9-point type); In re Air Crash
Disaster near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 789 F.2d 1092, 1098 (5th Cir. 1986),
aff'd on reh'g, 821 F.2d 1147, 1171 (1987).
262 While the certainty of unlimited liability in a class of cases would not help
airlines obtain inexpensive insurance, the rule may fairly be analogized to Article 25,
which waives the damage cap in cases of willful misconduct. Cf In reAir Crash Disaster at Gander, 660 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Ky 1987).
The court stated:

The 10-point guideline is a clear one, and quite easy to follow. To be
sure, any such line-drawing has an arbitrary air, but LOT is a party to
the line drawn [as a signatory of the Montreal Agreement] and it seems
to us less arbitrary to accept the 10-point standard than it would be to
guess on a case-by-case basis at what constitutes 'adequate notice.'
In re Warsaw, 705 F.2d at 90 n.10.
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point type culminated in a 1989 Supreme Court decision
that repudiated the Second Circuit precedents.
The Judicial Panel of Multidistrict Litigation consolidated KAL before Chief Judge Aubrey Robinson of the
DDC, who rejected Lisi, arguing that the "plain meaning"
of Article 3(2) preserves the damage cap regardless of any
"irregularit [ies]" in the passenger ticket.2 4 The court made
no attempt to reconcile the two conflicting sentences of Article 3(2). Nor did Judge Robinson consider the logical
conclusion of his argument. Is there some point where a
ticket becomes so irregular as to fail to qualify as a ticket?
What if the document contains none of the five particulars
required by Article 3(1)? What if the airline delivered a
blank form or an Article 3(1) (e) statement so small it "literally could be read only with a magnifying glass?" 26 5 What if

the document contained inaccuracies due to error or
fraud? Clearly, there must be some minimum requirements to qualify as a passenger ticket under Article 3(2),
and the particulars required by Article 3(1) seem as reasonable a candidate as any for the proper definition of passenger ticket.
The Supreme Court, per Justice Scalia, followed Judge
Robinson's "plain meaning" approach.2

6

The Court read

Article 3(2) to uphold the damage cap in cases of tickets
with "irregularit[ies]," including small type size. 67 The cap
is waived "only [when] the carrier [ ] fail [s] to deliver any document whatever, or ...

[delivers] a document whose short-

comings are so extensive that it cannot reasonably be
described as a 'ticket' (for example, a mistakenly delivered
blank form, with no data filled in) ."268 Thus, Justice Scalia
improved on the district court opinion by at least trying to
reconcile the two sentences of Article 3(2). Yet, while he
proclaimed his "unreasonably extensive shortcomings" test
In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. 1463, 1474 (D.D.C. 1985).
- See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122, 129, 150 (1989).
266 Id. at 122.
267 Id. at 128.
Id. at 128-29.
264
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to be different in kind from Lisi's minimal adequacy test, it
merely drew the line in a different place, a place unsupported by the text of Article 3(1) at that.
Justice Scalia deserves credit for citing a parallel decision
by the Supreme Court of Canada, thereby fulfilling the obligation of state parties to seek to harmonize their interpretation with the interpretations of other parties, especially
where establishing uniformity is a primary purpose of the
treaty. In most other respects, however, the Court failed to
recognize the differences between treaty interpretation and
the interpretation of domestic texts. The Court's treatment
of the travaux priparatoiresand reliance on the "plain meaning" of the unofficial English translation appear inconsistent with the Vienna Convention. 269 The Court also
dismissed an attempt to reconcile Articles 3 (1) and 3 (2) because there is "no textual basis" for it, without inquiring
into the object and purpose as the Vienna Convention
mandates. °
The Court clearly rejected the view that Article 3 embodies a purpose of notice. In particular, the Court plainly repudiated Lisi.2 7 t Despite the attack on its predecessor, it
2270

See discussion supra part III.
The Court stated:

It may seem reasonable enough that a carrier "shall not be entitled to
avail himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude or
limit his liability" when the ticket defect consists precisely of a failure
to give the passenger proper notice of those provisions. But there is

no textual basis for limiting the "defective-ticket-is-no-ticket" principle
to that particular defect. Thus, the liability limitation would also be
eliminated if the carrier failed to comply, for example, with the requirement of Article 3(1)(d) that the ticket contain the address of the
carrier.
Chan, 490 U.S. at 130. If Justice Scalia had regard for the object and purpose of
notifying passengers of the damage cap in order to enable self-protection, rather
than relying solely on the text, he might have found it possible to distinguish Article
3(1) (e)'s requirement for a statement of notice from the other particulars in Article
3(l). Once Article 3(1)(e) had been distinguished, Justice Scalia might have
reached the reasonable enough conclusion that the statement and the damage cap
are linked. It may be for precisely this reason that Justice Scalia was unable to cite
any cases waiving the damage cap for failure to print adequately the other four particulars in Article 3(1). Compare the Second Circuit's approach, supra note 232.
271 It is unclear whether the Court regarded Mertens as consistent with Article
3(2), since Mertens involved physical delivery and so falls more squarely within the
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might have been possible to reconcile Justice Scalia's opinion with In re Warsar. although Article 3(2) does not require adequate notice, KAL is bound by the ten point rule
established by the CAB Order and the Montreal Agreement. The Court argued, however, that the CAB Order
should not be read into Article 3 and did not independently provide for unlimited liability as punishment for failure to comply with the ten point rule. 2 Instead, the
United States is limited to the ordinary sanctions for CAB
violations (e.g. suspending the airline).2

Justice Scalia did not consider the Montreal Agreement
argument, believing that the Court's repudiation of Lisi
rendered it unnecessary. 4 Instead, the Court left that issue to Justice Brennan, speaking for the four concurring
Justices. Indeed, the issue was crucial to the concurrence.
Since Justice Brennan stated that Lisi "may well have been
correctly decided,"275 the decision to concur rather than
dissent hinged on two factors. First, even though 4.5 point
type may be inadequate (especially given Lis's characterization of the facts) ,276 KAL's eight point type "was surely 'adequate' under any conventional interpretation of that
term."2 77 Second, the concurrence expressly rejected In re
Warsaw's bright line rule: "The Montreal Agreement is a
private agreement among airline companies, which cannot
278
and does not purport to amend the Warsaw Convention."

The concurrence thus recognized Montreal's anomalous
character: neither a treaty nor a statute, but a contract
among all airlines flying in the United States, waiving cerpurview of the second sentence. See Chan, 490 U.S. at 128; see also In re KAL, 664 F.
Supp. 1463, 1473 (D.D.C. 1985).
2

Chan, 490 U.S. at 126 n.2.

-3See In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1476.
24 Chan, 490 U.S. at 126. Justice Scalia believed the Montreal Agreement could
only be relevant as the "standard of adequate notice" under Lisi and since the Court
rejected Lisi it need not identify the standard.
275 Chan, 490 U.S. at 150.
276 See supra note 230.
2" Chan, 490 U.S. at 151.
7 Id. at 150; see also In re KAL, 664 F. Supp. at 1476. The Second Circuit had
rejected this distinction as "sophistic." In re Warsaw, 705 F.2d at 90-91.
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tain of their treaty rights. 27 9' This unanimous view of the

Court is consistent with the Vienna Convention on the procedures required to make or amend a treaty.280 By analogy,
it is also consistent with the Court's strict view of the procedures necessary to pass domestic legislation.8 1
Nevertheless, although the Montreal Agreement technically cannot be regarded as an amendment to the Warsaw
Convention, one cannot help but wonder whether the
Court should have read the two instruments together to determine passengers' contractual rights under Montreal. After all, the airlines signed this agreement waiving their
treaty rights not for the benefit of their co-signatories but of
a third party, the flying public. Thus, the decision deprived
passengers, the Montreal Agreement's intended third-party
beneficiaries, of standing to contest certain violations, holding in effect that passengers benefit from the higher damage cap and the defense
waivers, but not from the ten point
28 2
type requirement.
Instead, the Supreme Court further shifted the balance
of the Warsaw system's trade-offs in favor of the airlines.
The Court eliminated the requirement of notice and
thwarted the advances in uniformity of documentation by
inviting the return of "Lisi-type" tickets. As a result, plaintiffs and lower courts are likely to become ever more frustrated with the Convention's damage cap, possibly fueling
searches for new escape routes. The result, of course,
would be less uniformity of substantive law and more
uncertainty.
C.

REMEDIES

AVAILABLE BEYOND THE CoNVENTION

Imagine a passenger on an international flight destined
for the United States, who is severely burned when a flight
attendant negligently spills coffee on her. Her injuries require hospital care, forcing her to miss work; all the while,
ff
'J
282

See gemerally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25.
Vienna Convention, supra note 66, arts. 6-25.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

See In re Warsaw, 705 F.2d at 90-91.
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she suffers much pain. Recognizing that her total damages
clearly exceed the Montreal Agreement limit of $75,000,
the carrier quickly offers to settle at $75,000. If she sues the
airline for more than $75,000 under a state law action for
respondeat superior,may the carrier have the case dismissed?
If not, does the Convention nevertheless restrict her total
remedies to the Montreal limit? May she sue the flight attendant for unlimited damages? Is the airline liable for attorney fees and interest on the judgment beyond the
damage cap?
The Supremacy Clause underlies the answers to all of
these questions: the Warsaw Convention preempts state law
to the extent of any conflict.283 If a claim falls within the
scope of the Convention, plaintiffs may obtain remedies
only to the extent consistent with the Convention. This
suggests a two-step inquiry: a remedy is available beyond
the Convention only if either (1) the claim falls outside the
Convention's scope or (2) the Convention permits the
remedy.
The first step turns largely on Article 1, which states that
the Convention "shall apply" to "all international transportation... by aircraft for hire." Article 1 thus limits the Convention's scope: the Convention simply does not apply to
surface transportation 28 4 or non-"international" flights. 2 815

Likewise, the Convention does not apply to gratuitous
flights performed by someone other than "an air transporSee discussion supra part V.A. The courts have recognized two circumstances
where, absent express intent to preempt, federal law impliedly preempts state law:
where federal law occupies a field by regulating so pervasively as to leave no room
for state action and where state laws might frustrate a national interest in uniformity.
See In re Lockerbie, 928 F.2d 1267, 1274-75 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331
(1991), and cases cited therein. In one case, the Supreme Court preempted a state
law for being inconsistent with a federal statute intended to promote international
uniformity. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 166-68 (1978), discussed in
id. at 1277-78. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, CONsTrrTUONAL LAw 291-300 (12th
ed. 1991).
- The Convention does govern surface transportation at the airport and may be
extended by contract to other surface transportation connected with air travel subject to the Convention. Warsaw Convention, supranote 13, arts. 18, 31.
- See supra note 18.
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tation enterprise" 286 or to flights "performed under the
terms of any international postal convention." 287 The Convention places absolutely no restrictions on lawsuits by
plaintiffs whose claims fall beyond its scope; their claims are
subject entirely to domestic law. 88
286Warsaw Convention, supra note 13, art. 1(1).
28

Id. art. 2(2).

In one respect, it is quite difficult to identify the limits of the Convention's
scope. If Articles 1 and 2(2) established the sole limits on the Convention's scope,
the Convention would then preempt a/other claims touching "international transportation ... by aircraft for hire." In that case, Articles 17-19 would establish the
sole basis for liability of "international" carriers, meaning that airlines would be immune from contractual, antitrust, environmental or other state law claims in their
"international" operations. One court has expressly noted the "absurdity" of this
position. Beaudet v. British Airways, 853 F. Supp. 1062, 1070 (N.D. Ill.
1994).
Thus, it appears that Articles 17-19 might also establish certain limits on the Convention's scope. For example, Article 17, which establishes carrier liability to passengers for personal injury or wrongful death, does not preempt state tort claims by
employees. Instead, employee claims lie outside the Convention's scope, which
must therefore be limited by Article 17. Cf California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S.
93, 105 (1989) (holding that, in the absence of a contrary Congressional purpose,
the Clayton Act does not preempt state law antitrust actions by indirect purchasers,
even though federal law only provides for recovery by direct purchasers).
Nevertheless, the view that claims which lie outside Article 17 may proceed in state
law should not be taken too far. It would gut the damage cap if carriers were liable
under the Convention for claims under Articles 17-19 and were subject to unlimited
liability in tort law for all other claims. It would be absurd, for instance, to conclude
that, because Article 17 only applies to dommage survenu, the Convention limits compensatory damages, but plaintiffs could collect unlimited punitive damages under
state law.
It also seems difficult to accept the Third Circuit's reasoning that the Convention
limits remedies where an "accident" occurs, but a plaintiff whose injury is completely internal may collect unlimited damages. Abramson v. Japan Airlines, 739
F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985) (holding that aggravation
of a passenger's hernia due to the crew's failure to provide adequate space for him
to lie down to administer a self-help remedy is not an "accident" under Article 17, so
the carrier is not liable under the Convention, but it may be liable under state law).
Such reasoning would expose a negligent airline to greater liability to a passenger
injured by fist fighting, falling down drunk, or attempting suicide than to innocent
passengers killed in a plane crash. Price v. British Airways, 1992 WL 170679
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment where
parties agreed the case was governed by the Convention, on the grounds that a
fistfight between passengers is not an "accident," because it is unrelated to the operation of the aircraft); Levy v. American Airlines, 1993 WL 205857 (S.D.N.Y. June 9,
1993), aff'd, 22 F.3d 1092 (2d Cir. 1994) (following Price, found that no "accident"
occurred where a prisoner being transported attempted suicide and was restrained
by federal agents and held that plaintiff's action could proceed under state law);
Padilla v. Olympic Airways, 765 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding the carrier
was not liable under the Convention because no "accident" occurred where a drunk
28
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The second step of the inquiry hinges on Article 24,
which reads in part: "any action for damages, however
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and
limits set out in the Convention." Article 24 makes clear
that the Convention prevents plaintiffs from circumventing
its damage cap through state law. For claims falling within
the Convention's scope, then, the Convention precludes
the collection of any remedy above the damage cap, except
as the Convention permits.289
In the face of Article 24, a federal judge in California
plainly erred by holding that Article 22 did not limit the
claims of survivors of deceased passengers who were themselves not passengers. The court reasoned that the Convention regulates the passenger-carrier contract, but not
California wrongful death law. 29° In other words, the court
believed that Article 22's damage cap applied only to dampassenger collapsed in the bathroom, without addressing whether an action could
proceed under state law because plaintiff did not bring a state law claim).
Instead, some limitations in Article 17 must not limit the Convention's scope, but
instead limit the carrier's liability by preempting damages beyond Article 17 for
claims arising from transportation within Article 1. Cf United States v. Smith, 499
U.S. 160 (1991) (holding that the Federal Tort Claims Act immunizes federal employees from tort suits arising from acts within the scope of their employment, even
where the Act excludes governmental liability for their acts). Perhaps recognizing
the difficulty of drawing this line, the Supreme Court has twice declined to do so.
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 407 (on state law claims where no "accident" occurred); Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. at 546 (on state law claims where no
IUsion corporelle occurred). In deference to the Court, and because identifying the
precise scope of the Convention falls beyond the scope of this article, this author will
(at least for the present article) likewise decline.
The mandatory language of Article 1-the Convention "shall apply"-supports
this conclusion. CompareSoci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States
Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 534 & n.15 (1987) (holding permissive language of Hague
Evidence Convention renders it non-exclusive) with Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988) (holding that, due to its mandatory language, the Hague Service Convention "preempts inconsistent methods of service
prescribed by state law in all cases ...within Article 1"). To the extent that Airospatiale may be understood to have established more general arguments against the
exclusivity of treaties, these have been negated by Volkswagenwerk; furthermore, two
of these arguments would not apply to the Warsaw Convention and the third is "illusory." Airospatiale,482 U.S. at 540 n.25, 565-66 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
- In reAir Crash in Bali, Indon., 462 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D. Ca. 1978), rev'd, 684
F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982). The district court decision reeks of hostility to the damage cap, which it purports to justify with a "fledgling industry" argument. Id. at
1125. The opinion confesses as much, identifying itself as part of a trend that dem-
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ages available under the Convention, without limiting
plaintiffs' ability to collect higher damages under state tort
law.
This distinction is untenable. The international community recognized in adopting Article 24 that a damage cap
simply cannot function unless those damages it allows are
exclusive. Permitting state law routes around the damage
cap would thwart the Convention's purposes of uniformity
and certainty. 91 The Convention also could not promote
settlement of mass tort claims, because the prospect of
other, higher remedies would gut the Convention's "essential bargain." Thus, Article 24 expressly applies the damage
cap to "any action, however founded," in "the cases covered
by" Articles 17-19. Since Article 17 includes actions for the
"death . . . of a passenger," Article 24 applies to wrongful
death actions and the Convention preempts state law to the
extent it allows survivors to collect damages greater than
$75,000.
Likewise, the Convention preempts state law to the extent that law allows plaintiffs to collect unlimited damages
against airline employees. Since Articles 17 and 22 both refer to the liability of the carrier, plaintiffs have argued that
the . Convention's damage cap only protects the carrier,
leaving other potential defendants (for example, employees, agents and manufacturers) open to suit for unlimited
damages. The Second Circuit rejected plaintiffs' efforts to
sue an airline pilot, however, recognizing that such damages would really be paid by the carrier and ultimately the
flying public through higher ticket prices, which would defeat the purpose of certainty. 92 Also, such suits against emonstrates "the courts' protection of injured parties from Warsaw's liability limitations." Id. at 1122-23.
2 The court of appeals rejected the passenger-carrier distinction for thwarting
"the full purposes and objectives of Congress," because uniformity and certainty
both require that the Convention preempt state tort law. In re Bai, 684 F.2d at
1307-08 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
- Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1081 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).

The Supreme Court applied similar logic in upholding a mandatory forum clause in
a form contract for cruise ship passengers, on the grounds that passengers also benefit from the clause through lower ticket prices due to the carrier's reduced legal
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ployees would be governed by local tort law, thereby
defeating uniformity. 293 The international community rec-

ognized this principle by expressly applying the damage cap
to a carrier's employees and agents. 94
Plaintiffs whose claims fall within the scope of the Convention thus have their remedies limited to the damage cap
of $8,300, except as permitted by the Convention, such as
the exceptions in Articles 3 and 25.2- The most important
exception for modern American plaintiffs, of course, is Article 22(4), which permits the Montreal Agreement, as a
"special contract," to raise the damage cap to $75,000.
More precisely, the Montreal Agreement sets the damage
cap at "$75,000 inclusive of legal fees and costs, except that,
in the case of a claim brought in a State where provision is
limit
made for separate award of legal fees and costs, the 296
'
shall be U.S. $58,000 exclusive of legal fees and costs."
Thus, the Montreal Agreement plainly fixes the availability of attorney fees for claims falling within its scope, i.e.,
wrongful death and personal injury claims stemming from
"international" flights to or from the United States. A
plaintiff in most U.S. jurisdictions who collected $60,000 in
damages may be awarded $10,000 in attorney fees, because
the total would remain below $75,000; plaintiffs in some jurisdictions may receive unlimited legal fees, but only
$58,000 in other damages.
costs. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991). The logic of
Shute is much more compelling in the case of airline liability, where so much more

money is involved that the added costs would have to be passed on to consumers. In
essence, higher damage caps amount to requiring passengers to purchase travel insurance. Moreover, those added costs would unfairly require passengers of average
income to subsidize wealthy passengers' insurance costs: all passengers would pay
the same surcharge, but the wealthy would recover more for the same injury because
the damages hinges on income. See supra note 6.
293 Reed, 555 F.2d at 1089.
294 Hague

Protocol, supra note 57, art. 14; Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 57,

art. 11. Likewise, when the international community authorized signatories to establish supplemented compensation plans, it forbade the taxation of carriers and their
employees and agents to fund such schemes. Guatemala City Protocol, supra note

57, art. 14.
-5 See discussion supra part V.B.
2-6 Montreal Agreement, supra note 51, at 552 (emphasis added).
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Attorney fees present a harder question for some nonMontreal claims.2 97 They are only available-even below
the damage cap-if they are regarded as dommage survenu,
or compensatory damages. And the text of Article 22, read
in the light of its object and purpose of certainty, strongly
suggests that attorney fees should not be available beyond
the damage cap. This was the view of the United States,
which, according to the Supreme Court, is "entitled to great
weight." 298 But the United States was alone in this view.
Countries where courts regularly award fees to the prevailing party (e.g. Britain) argued that the Convention did not
affect this ordinary principle of their domestic judicial systems.2 9 And, since the Supreme Court has also stated that
the Convention's purpose of uniformity forbids its interpretation in a manner likely to cause difficulties for other signatories, 0° in this instance the purposes of uniformity and
certainty suggest opposing interpretations."'
Related considerations apply to interest awards (pre- and
post-judgment). Given the lengthy litigation which often
follows air disasters, interest can amount to a significant
percentage of the total damages. 0 2 If interest awards are
regarded as compensatory, 30 3 then they are clearly permissible in cases where total damages remain below the damage
cap or Articles 3 or 25 waive the cap. 0 4
297 On attorney fees in cases concerning damaged cargo, see Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984), cet.
denied, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985).
-'Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Afrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482
U.S. 522, 536 n.19 (1987).
- Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 25, at 507-08.
- Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991).
-0! Ratif ing the Montreal Protocols would resolve this issue, because Article 2
amends Article 22 of the Convention to allow fees under some circumstances and
provides that "[t ] he costs of the action including lawyers' fees shall not be taken into
account in applying the limits under this Article."
m Interest in one case totalled $31,604.79 on a $75,000 award. The court derived
this figure from New York's statutory interest rates of 6% and 9%,which substantially undervalued the actual interest rates during the period 1975-82. O'Rourke v.
Eastern Air Lines, 730 F.2d 842, 851 n.14 (2d Cir. 1984).
-' See, e.g., Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 814 F. Supp. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1993),
aff'd in relevant par4 1994 WL 685690 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 1994).
-Id. (allowing pre-judgment interest where defendant was found guilty of do).
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The law becomes murky, however, where plaintiffs seek
interest above the damage cap in cases not covered by Articles 3 or 25. In connected cases arising from the same
crash, the Second and Fifth Circuits split on this issue; an
evenly divided Supreme Court failed to resolve the split.305
While recognizing the Convention's purposes of uniformity
and certainty, the Fifth Circuit believed that the [Montreal
Agreement's] purposes of raising awards and promoting efficient resolution of claims allowed courts to award both preand post-judgment interest even where the total damages
exceed the cap. 06 The court's reasoning is implausible.
Even if one accepts that a private agreement can modify the
purposes of a treaty-and that Montreal in fact did so-an
agreement which expressly sets a fixed damage cap of
$75,000 cannot contain a purpose which justifies awarding
damages above that cap.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit also erred in reaching
the opposite conclusion. 0 7 The court properly recognized
that the purposes of uniformity and certainty argued
against allowing interest awards above the cap, but erred by
denying the existence of a third purpose: the efficient resolution of disputes. 08 The court thus avoided the need to
resolve tensions among the Convention's purposes. Unfortunately, this approach proves too facile. A preferable approach would recognize all the Convention's purposes and
then prioritize the overriding purposes of uniformity and
certainty. Also, the court should have relied on the absence
of textual support for an exception for interest to the fixed
damage cap, as courts may not deviate from a treaty's text
to "better" promote its purposes.3°9
- Mahfoud v. Eastern Air Lines, 479 F. Supp. 1130 (W.D. La. 1982), aff'd without
opinion, 729 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided court,
474 U.S. 213 (1985). An unresolved circuit split is particularly unfortunate in connected cases decided under a law intended to promote uniformity. See discussion

supra part IV.
- Domangue v. Eastern Air Lines, 722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1984).
07 O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, 730 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984). Accord Deere &
Co. v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesell-schaft, 855 F.2d 385, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1988).
O'Roudk 730 F.2d at 853-54 n.20.

See discussion supra part III.A.
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The Fifth Circuit is on stronger ground in awarding postjudgment interest, which more clearly promotes efficiency.
Such awards also present fewer difficulties regarding certainty, because the principle of certainty hinges on fixing
carriers' costs, not on the size of plaintiffs' awards per se.
Given the time-value of money, awarding post-judgment in-.
terest merely keeps the carrier's liability costs constant at
$75,000. Thus, refusing to award postjudgment interest
would allow carriers to reduce their real costs below the
Montreal limit by delaying payment of judgments, clearly
thwarting the purpose of speedy resolution.310 Further, the
local concern for prompt execution of judicial decisions
may well take precedence over the international interest in
certainty of air litigation.
While it is clear that the Convention establishes the exclusive [remedy] for passenger claims, some courts have gone
further, finding that the Convention also establishes the exclusive [cause of action],?" In other words, under this view,
the Convention not only preempts those state remedies
which contravene the Convention, but preempts state tort
actions altogether. Thus, a defendant airline could quash a
suit brought under a state law theory such as negligence;
plaintiffs could only sue under the Convention."' Justify310Of course, a similar argument could also be made to support prejudgment
interest: in order to keep the carrier's liability costs constant, the $75,000 should be
fixed from the time of the accident. See O'Rour/e 730 F.2d at 859-60 (Pratt, J., dissenting). This has indeed been the practice in other fields (e.g. Tide VII).
Domangue, 722 F.2d at 263-64. In those fields, however, federal law seeks to maximize both the compensation to the plaintiff and the punishment against the defendant, whereas the Convention's primary purpose is to restrict carrier liability. The
contrary views of latter day U.S. policy-makers supporting greater recoveries for air
passengers are legally irrelevant until the Convention is modified or terminated.
Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552. It also seems inappropriate to award prejudgment interest
given the procedural posture of many aviation cases: carrier willingness to settle at
the damage cap and plaintiff-driven litigation to circumvent the cap. See O'Rourke,
730 F.2d at 853-54 n.20; LEE S. KRIENDLER, 3 AVIATION ACcIDENT LAw 27-3-27-4
(1978).
311 See, e.g.,. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267,
1273-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991); Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1186 (1985).
312 To reach this conclusion, of course, one must first accept that the Convention
itself creates an independent cause of action. After an early New York State case
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ing this interpretation, the Second Circuit argued that state
law causes "could [not] fail to frustrate the purposes" of uniformity and certainty.313
.Nevertheless, the Second Circuit's interpretation cannot
be reconciled with the Convention's text. Article 24's reference to "any action for damages, however founded,"31 4 clearly
contemplates the existence of causes other than the Convention. t5 Since the Convention permits other causes, it
does not preempt state causes.31 6 Instead, the Convention
preempts only those state law remedies which conflict with
the Convention's own, exclusive remedies.
This result is accurate because it is mandated by the Convention's text, but unfortunate because it is inconsistent
with the Convention's purposes. Where a plaintiff brings a
proclaimed, "[i]f the convention did not create'a cause of action in Art. 17, it is
difficult to understand just what Art. 17 did do," Salamon v. Koninklijke Luchvaart
Maatschappi, N.V., 107 N.Y.S.2d 768, 773 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951), the Second Circuit
twice held the opposite. Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 209 F.2d 436
(2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957). After considering the
French text of Article 24, implementation in Britain and Canada, the purpose of
uniformity, Noeds possible inconsistency with Article 17 and the benefits of the Multidistrict Litigation Act, the Second Circuit rightly reversed itself. Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114
(1979).
- In re Lockerbie 928 F.2d at 1275.
314 The governing French text of this phrase reads: "d queique titre que ce soit"
315See Rhymes v. Arrow Air, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. Fla. 1986); In re KAL, 932
F.2d 1475, 1491-92 (D.C. Cir.) (Mikva, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied sub norn.
Dooley v. Korean Air Lines, 112 S.Ct. 616 (1991). The opposing views of Rhymes
and In re Lockerbie clashed in a later stage of the Lockerbie litigation, when plaintiffs who sued in both state and federal court in Florida opposed consolidation 'of
their federal claims in the Eastern District of New York. The Second Circuit ordered
the consolidation, Coker v. Pan Am. World Airways, 950 F.2d 839, 847-48 (2d Cir.
1991), following the D.C. Circuit's decision in KAL that Van Dusen does not apply to
multidistrict litigation. See discussion supra part IV.B.
316 Even the Second Circuit appears to recognize this point, distinguishing between "state causes of action outside the Convention," which it finds unavailable, and
.state causes of action under the Convention," which may be available. In re Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1282-85 (emphasis added). It is unclear what results from this
distinction. For example, do federal courts have federal question jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 for state actions in negligence "under" the Convention? Instead of
(potentially) absorbing state law into federal law, the court should have recognized
that the Convention does not preempt what it permits and thus leaves state causes
alone.
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state tort claim in state court without mentioning the Convention in a well-pleaded complaint, the defendant airline
may not invoke a Convention defense as grounds to remove
the suit to federal court.31 7 This in turn prevents the suit's
multidistrict consolidation,318 thereby requiring wasteful,
repetitive litigation.3

19

Furthermore, by multiplying the

number of judges to interpret the Convention and juries to
determine critical facts, the existence of state causes threatens uniformity. In particular, reliance on state causes of action could result in the antithesis of uniformity-different
results for similarly situated passengers on the same
flight 32°-ifjuries in connected cases reached different verdicts on a central issue (e.g. the existence of dol) or if choice
of law analysis required application of the laws of several
states to passengers on the same flight. And since airlines
cannot predict which state law(s) will apply, allowing state
3 21
causes also destroys certainty.
The Second Circuit accurately identified the threat state
causes pose to the Convention's purposes, but erred by putting the Convention's purposes ahead of its text.322 Since

the text allows state causes, all the policy arguments against
them are appropriately directed towards the political
branches, not the courts. Indeed, as the Second Circuit observed in striving to promote uniformity by considering the
Convention's implementation in other signatories (focusing on other federal states), "England, Canada and Austra317 The removal jurisdiction of federal courts may be based on a federal complaint
but not on a federal defense. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. At least in theory, a defendant
airline may be able to remove a disaster case to federal court based on its diversity
jurisdiction. See genera//y PAUL M. BATOR, ET AL., HART & WEcHSLER's-THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1052-57, 1767-88 (3d ed. 1988).
318 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Charlotte, 393 F. Supp. 1404, 1405 n.1 (J.P.M.L.
1975). The district court must have subject matter jurisdiction to transfer a claim.
Bancohio Corp. v. Fox, 516 F.2d 29, 32 (6th Cir. 1975).
319The unnecessary costs of repetitive litigation are particularly troubling where
the defendant is bankrupt. See Coker v. Pan Am. World Airways, 950 F.2d 839, 847
(2d Cir. 1991).
32o

See discussion supra part IV.

See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot., 928 F.2d 1267, 1273-76, 1287-88 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 331 (1991).
3n, See discussion supra part III.A.
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lia have all enacted implementing statutes that make an
Article 17 action" exclusive.3 23 But the court should have

left this matter to Congress, instead of achieving by interpretation what other signatories achieved by legislation.324
If Congress wishes to legislate to preempt state causes of
action, it has the constitutional power to do so;325 the President may also negotiate and, with Senate consent, enter a
protocol to amend Article 24.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the adequate delivery line of cases, the Supreme Court
promptly resolved a circuit split over the interpretation of
the Warsaw Convention. In so doing, the Court imposed a
single interpretation of the Convention on all courts in the
United States, thereby avoiding forum shopping and choice
of law problems.326 In other words, the Court preserved the
Convention's purposes of uniformity and certainty.
Nevertheless, it cannot be expected that the Supreme
Court will resolve every possible circuit split in interpreting
the Warsaw Convention. The Court simply receives too
many petitions of certiorari, and grants too few writs, to reIn re Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1274.
- In reKorean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1985, 932 F.2d 1475, 1492 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (Mikva, J., dissenting in part). Note, however, that while other signatories
32-

may require legislation to implement a treaty at all, the American constitutional
system allows judges to directly implement "self-executing" treaties. Foster & Elam v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). Cf Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
525

The "necessary and proper" clause allows Congress to legislate to implement

treaties. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The foreign commerce, interstate commerce, and federal court jurisdiction clauses are also apropos.
s- A split on this issue would have given plaintiffs an enormous financial interest
in applying Second Circuit law, while defendant airlines would have had an equal

incentive to prefer D.C. Circuit law. Such diverging interests could prevent consolidation under the Multidistrict Litigation Act, making air crash litigation an even
greater burden on the judicial system. While the judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-

gation has consolidated cases in districts opposed by a party due to differences in the
laws of the transferor and transferee districts, In re Air Crash Disaster near Hanover,
N.H. on Oct. 25, 1968, 314 F. Supp. 62, 63 (J.P.M.L. 1970); In re Plumbing Fixtures
Litig., 342 F. Supp. 756, 958 (J.P.M.L. 1972), those rulings assumed that the transferee court would follow the transferor's law, or assumption the D.C. Circuit rejected in KAL See discussion supra part IV.B.
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solve the countless issues sure to arise in future air crash
litigation. And, at least once, an evenly divided court failed
to resolve a circuit split.3 27 Clearly, whenever the Court

acts, it promotes uniformity-at least within the United
States-by establishing a single rule for the lower courts to
follow. But even where the Court resolutely settles a matter
for the purposes of the Convention's implementation in
the United States, it does not necessarily reach the right decision-"right" in the sense that it interprets the Convention according to the international law of treaty
interpretation in such a way as to promote international
uniformity.
Thus, it appears that reliance on the Supreme Court to
ensure the proper implementation of the Convention
would be misplaced. An alternative mechanism seems preferable: the establishment of a "shadow" 328 court to handle
mass tort litigation under the Warsaw Convention. A
shadow court responsible at the trial level for all internaeven in cases
tional air disasters would promote uniformity
329
which do not reach the Supreme Court.

S27 Mahfoud v. Eastern Air Lines, 479 F. Supp. 1130 (W.D. La. 1982), aff'd without
opinion, 729 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd without opinion 6y an equally divided court,
474 U.S. 213 (1985).
S328A "shadow" court is so-named because it is not a permanent organization, but
is rather a panel of federal judges who ordinarily sit as generalists, but who come
together temporarily to handle a specific matter. Thus, a group of judges could be
assigned to hear all mass tort litigation arising under the Warsaw Convention, using
a definition of mass torts based on the number of plaintiffs and the amount of damages to ensure that only major, complex cases triggered the shadow court mechanism. The worst air disasters would satisfy, for example, the conditions of eligibility
proposed by an ABA Commission: "at least 250 civil tort claims arising from a single
accident ...each of which involves a claim in excess of $50,000 for wrongful death,
personal injury, or physical damage to or destruction of tangible property... pending in different federal district courts or in one federal district court and one or
more state courts." ABA, COMM'N ON MASS TORTS, REP. TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
(1989). Cf Jack B. Weinstein, Proceduraland Substantive Problems in Complex Litigation
Arising from Disasters,5 Touso L. R. 1, 14-16 (1988) (discussing proposed legislation
to provide for federal subject matter jurisdiction in "multiparty, multiforum" cases
in which at least twenty-five people bring claims for at least $50,000 arising from a
"single event or occurrence").
Cf Edward D. Re, Litigation before the United States Court of InternationalTrade, 19
2
U.S.C.A. 1994 Supp. xiii, xviii (arguing that the creation of a single trial court for
international trade litigation promotes the Constitutional mandate for uniformity in
tariffs by ensuring "the consistent application of the customs and trade laws").
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Furthermore, a shadow tribunal would provide advantages over the present system for mass tort management.33
The existence of such a tribunal would preclude the need
for the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to determine whether to consolidate. There would be no risk of
the mess which would follow should the Panel decide
against consolidation: conflicts of law, forum shopping, inequities resulting from different treatment for identically
situated plaintiffs, transfer motions, etc. And a shadow
court is even preferable to consolidation, because it brings
the case together for trial as well as pre-trial and it precludes the possibility that a circuit court may split from the
District of Columbia Circuit's decision on KAL's Van Dusen
question in a Warsaw Convention case.331
Nevertheless, the vast majority of air disaster cases are
(and remain) consolidated, 32 andJudge Weinstein believes
that existing mechanisms handle such "single event" cases
well enough that they do not warrant resolution by shadow
courts, which should be reserved for "mass exposure" cases
like asbestos litigation.3 This may be true for domestic air
disasters, but a shadow court offers additional advantages
for litigation involving international crashes by serving as a
mechanism to implement the Warsaw Convention.
By eliminating the multiplicity of trial courts, a shadow
tribunal would necessarily promote uniformity and certainty-in much the same way that a Supreme Court decision does, but on a more routine basis. Through
experience, the court would gain familiarity with the basics
of treaty interpretation (e.g. the Vienna Convention),
thereby promoting consistency with other signatories' interpretations (i.e. uniformity). The court should have access
to more considerable support resources than would individ-

3"

To realize these benefits, the shadow court's organic statute should expressly
preempt state law causes of action for matters falling within the scope of the Convention. See discussion supra part V.C.
"' See supra note 157.
332 TuRLYv, supra note 128, §§ 12.01, 12.06 (1986).
33 SeeJack B. Weinstein, PreliminaryReflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11
COLUM. J. EtvrL. L. 1, 5-7 (1986).
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ual district judges: access to the travaux priparatoires,
French-speaking staff, and an extensive comparative law library.334 In short, a court which routinely interpreted a
treaty could be expected to be sensitive to the differences
between interpreting treaties and statutes, which, in the
end, may prove even more valuable than its subject-matter
expertise. 3
Even so, however, simply establishing a shadow tribunal
would be insufficient, because it fails to address the root
cause of the misinterpretations of the Warsaw Convention:
the damage cap is too low. The vast difference between the
Convention's maximum remedies and the damages which
plaintiffs can collect under an ordinary tort action for
wrongful death or personal injury encourages plaintiffs to
litigate. Furthermore, the cap is so low as to encourage ju334See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 67, § 325, rpts. note 3. For a good comparative study ofjudicial implementation of the Convention, see generally GEORGETTE

MILLER, LIABILIT IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT: THE WARSAW SYSTEM IN MUNICIPAL COURTS (1977).
-3 A less dramatic proposal would offer some of the advantages of a shadow court;
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation could routinely transfer Warsaw Convention disaster cases to the same district court, such as the Eastern District of New
York or the District of the District of Columbia. The Panel's reasoning in In re KAL,
575 F. Supp. at 343, would allow regular consolidation before an "expert" district.
That district would then receive the additional resources proposed for the shadow
court in the accompanying text. Alternatively, the Panel could regularly consolidate
cases before a small number of courts in different circuits, thereby allowing fresh,
independent analysis of the issues, unencumbered by circuit precedents. Such an
approach, of course, would depend on the Supreme Court to preserve uniformity by
resolving any resulting circuit splits.
These approaches would require certain changes in the Panel's policies for selecting the transferee forum, particularly its preference for consolidation in the district
where the situs of an accident is located. See In re Mid-Air Collision near Fairland,
Ind., 309 F. Supp. 621, 622-23 (J.P.M.L. 1970). While the reasoning of KAL seems to
support frequent consolidation in an "expert" district, the Panel had previously rejected an argument for consolidation in the D.D.C. based on its experience with
unrelated, though similar, securities litigation. In re Tenneco Inc. Sec. Litig., 426 F.
Supp. 1187-89 (J.P.M.L. 1977). The Panel also is "reluctant" to consolidate a case in
a district where none of the actions are pending, though there is precedent for
doing so. In re Sundstrand Data Control, Inc. Patent Litig., 443 F. Supp. 1019, 1021
(J.P.M.L. 1978). And, in a case with no actions pending in the Western District of
Washington, the Panel rejected an argument by defendant Boeing which would
have resulted in the consolidation of most Warsaw Convention cases there, where
Boeing's headquarters are located. In re Air Crash Disaster near Papeete, Tahiti, on
July 22, 1973, 397 F. Supp. 886, 887 (J.P.M.L. 1975).

1994-1995]

AIR DISASTER LITIGATION

529

dicial sympathy for the plaintiffs-resulting in a pattern of
pro-plaintiff precedents, which in turn encourages subsequent plaintiffs to sue as well.33 This failure has prevented
the Convention from facilitating settlements, so litigation
has been the norm in air disasters. Despite the fact that the
United States was advocating a higher limit even back at the
Montreal Conference, the damage cap has not been raised
in over twenty-five years-a period during which tort remedies generally have skyrocketed. This fact has brought the
otherwise sound Warsaw system into disrepute, and may
some day even result in a judgment that the cap is so low as
to be unconstitutional. One can propose remedies to narrow loopholes in the Convention, and to foreclose alternative causes of action, but these remedies can only be
temporary. Unless the root problem is addressed by raising
the damage cap to an equitable level (and perhaps indexing it to stay there despite inflation), s the judiciary will
continue to find ways to circumvent it.
Nevertheless, it is not the role of the judiciary to address
this root problem. So long as the Warsaw Convention reIndeed, it may be said that plaintiffs today are escaping from the $75,000 cap
as beneficiaries of the 1960s precedents in which judges demonstrated their hostility
to the pre-Montreal cap of $8300.
"7 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Supreme Court, in dictum,
have recognized the need for periodic adjustments of a fixed damage cap. Marian
Nash Leich, Current Development: The Montreal Protocols to the Warsaw Convention on
InternationalCarriageby Air, 76 AM.J. INT'L L. 412, 414 (1982) (quoting a Committee
report stating that "it will be desirable to seek continued increases in the agreed
limit to keep pace with inflation and other circumstances"); Franklin Mint, 466 U.S.
at 256 (recognizing that "in the long term, effectuation of the Convention's objective of international uniformity might require periodic adjustment by the CAB of the
dollar-based limit [of liability for baggage] to account both for the dollar's changing
value relative to other Western currencies and, if necessary, for changes in the conversion rates adopted by other Convention signatories").
While indexing would theoretically ensure that damage awards remain at equitable levels despite inflation, it would raise numerous practical difficulties if included
in a uniform Convention. If damages were indexed separately to each nation's inflation rate, it would create a public perception that awards were unfairly rising faster
in some countries, even though uniformity in real values would be preserved. Conversely, if damages were indexed to an average world inflation rate (or to the inflation rate of a single country), then passengers in low-inflation countries would be
eligible to receive higher real awards than would residents of high-inflation
countries.
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mains the "supreme law of the land," the judiciary must enforce it-subject only to constitutional limitations 3 8 A
proper solution may only be effected by the political
branches. By refraining from waiving the damage cap ad
hoc in high publicity cases, the courts would allow public
concerns to heighten until the public compelled Congress
to act, thereby resulting in a generally applicable, democratic solution.
Of course, a Congressionally-enacted solution would not
necessarily work. In particular, simply raising the damage
cap would not suffice. Just as plaintiffs today continue to
benefit from the pre-Montreal precedents, future plaintiffs
could benefit from today's law even if the damage cap were
increased. A lasting solution would require a break from
current law, a change sharp enough to instruct the courts
to abandon the anti-Warsaw precedents. Thus, for example, Congress should clearly indicate the extent to which
the Convention preempts other causes of action and the
permissible sanctions judges may impose against airlines
found guilty of "willful misconduct" or failure to provide an
Article 3(1) (e) statement in ten point type. Congress could
also usefully define such concepts as "willful misconduct"
and "passenger ticket."
Congress could raise the damage cap by statute, either by
overriding Article 22331 (thereby placing the increased burden on the airlines) or by creating a supplemental compensation scheme (thereby placing the burden on the
taxpayers). In fact, the Clinton Administration has endorsed ratification of the Montreal Protocols, which specifically permit such supplementary compensation schemes. 340
338

See discussion supra part V.A.

ss9 Under the "later in time" rule of the Supremacy Clause, Congress always retains the power to override the domestic effects of treaties with subsequent legislation. See RESTATEMENT (THiIW), supra note 67, § 115, cmt. a, rptr. note 1. As such an
approach would involve a clear breach of U.S. international obligations, Id. at cmt.
b; HENKIN, CASEBOOK, supra note 68, at 206-07 (quoting Secretary of State Charles
Evans Hughes) it should be disfavored, particularly where internationally acceptable
solutions are available.
340 Senator Mitchell proposed a compensation plan in the 102d Congress, which
passengers would fund by paying an earmarked tax of three to five dollars on ticket
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This approach would enable the United States to work with
the world community to forge a new consensus, thereby satisfying its equitable concerns without breaching its international obligations.
Indeed, apart from the particular merits of the plan
under consideration, it is preferable for the United States
to effect change by negotiating and ratifying a new protocol, rather than enacting a statute in breach of the Warsaw
Convention. Such an approach would enable the United
States to retain the Convention's benefits generally, while
eradicating the unacceptably low damage cap and directing
the courts to interpret the Convention to maximize the fulfillment of its purposes: promoting international uniformity, encouraging dispute resolution by settlement, and
maintaining a damage cap at a level which protects passengers' equitable interests, airlines' financial interests, and
the interests of both in certainty.

sales, to be collected by the airlines. The scheme would cover all compensatory
damages above the cap. S. 2945, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). It seems likely that

the Senate would require the establishment of a supplementary compensation
mechanism as a condition of its consent to the Montreal Protocols. Thomas J.
Whalen, The Supplemental CompensationPlan to the Warsaw Convention, 11 LLOYD'S AviATION LAW 2, 3-4 (Aug. 1, 1992). The Senate may require domestic acts by the Presi-

dent as a condition of its consent to entering a treaty.
supra note 61, at 134 & nn. 20, 24.
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